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IS THE TRUE THREATS DOCTRINE
THREATENING THE FIRST AMENDMENT?
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF THE
COLUMBIA/WILLAMETTE, INC. V. AMERICAN
COALITION OF LIFE ACTIVISTS SIGNALS THE
NEED TO REMEDY AN INADEQUATE
DOCTRINE
Lori Weiss*
INTRODUCTION

It used to be that one had to commit a crime such as robbing a bank
to be featured in a wanted poster. To the shock of a number of
physicians and clinics offering reproductive services, it today seems
that providing abortion services will suffice. Planned Parenthood of
the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life
Activists'-more notoriously known as the "Nuremberg Files" case'has been a focus of First Amendment commentary3 since a federal
jury in Oregon awarded several abortion-providing physicians and
two clinics offering reproductive services $109 million in February
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank my
family and friends for their constant love, support and encouragement. I would also
like to thank Professor Abner Greene, whose invaluable insight and guidance made
the completion of this Note possible.
1. 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., Kozinski, J., Berzon, J.,
dissenting), reh'g en banc denied, No. 99-35320, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 13829 (July 10,
2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2637 (2003). The defendants, consisting of two
organizations, American Coalition of Life Activists ("ACLA"), Advocates for Life
Ministries ("ALM") and fourteen of their founders and leaders, will be referred to
collectively as "ACLA" unless otherwise specified.
2. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Anti-Abortion Site on Web Has Ignited Free Speech
Debate, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1999, at Al (explaining that the site has been named for
the German city where Nazi officers were tried after World War I for crimes against
humanity).
3. See, e.g., Seth D. Berlin, Are the Nuremberg Files and "Wanted" Posters
Protected Advocacy or Unprotected Threat?, Comm. Law., Summer 2002, at 1; Clay
Calvert & Robert D. Richards, The "True Threat" to Cyberspace: Shredding the First
Amendment for Faceless Fears, 7 CommLaw Conspectus 291 (1999); Bruce Fein, Free
Speech or Verbal Terrorism?, Wash. Times, May 28, 2002, at A13, available at 2002
WL 2911349; Eugene Volokh, Free Speech is Nothing to Fear,Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 2001,
at A34.
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1999. 4 As part of its impassioned campaign to put an end to abortion,
the American Coalition of Life Activists ("ACLA")5 published the
"Deadly Dozen" and "Wanted" posters, reminiscent of the old Wild
West posters issued to capture outlaws, featuring physicians "Guilty
of Crimes Against Humanity" for providing reproductive services.6
The posters contained the names, addresses, and phone numbers,
along with a $5,000 reward for "information leading to the arrest,
conviction and revocation of license to practice medicine, 7 of the
featured individuals. In addition to the posters, the anti-abortionist
group published the "Nuremberg Files" website,8 urging readers to
"Visualize Abortionists on Trial."9 Images of fetuses and dripping
blood surrounded the website's legend, which listed working
physicians in black font, the wounded in gray, and names with
strikethroughs to mark the fatalities.
The physicians asserted that these materials constituted a "true
threat" as defined by the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
of 1994 ("FACE"). 0 The complicated aspect of the case was that
neither the posters nor the Nuremberg Files explicitly threatened the
physicians. Rather, the perceived threat stemmed from the murders
of physicians who were featured in previously released posters
containing language and attributes closely analogous to those
employed in the materials in question.1 1 As noted by the Ninth
Circuit, by the time the materials were published, "the poster format
itself had acquired currency as a death threat for abortion
providers."12 The physicians, haunted by the fate of those featured in
ACLA posters before them, sought to remove the materials from
circulation.
The dependency of alleged threats on the context in which they
were expressed produced a great deal of discord among judges and
commentators alike. At the heart of the debate lie two major
questions: (1) Whether the materials at issue constitute a true threat
or incitement of unlawful action; and (2) Whether speech can be
denied First Amendment protection based on context alone. 3 Any
4. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. ACLA, 41 F. Supp.
2d 1130 (D. Or. 1999).
5. The ACLA is a Portland-based anti-abortion organization. See infra notes
280-84 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. ACLA, 945 F. Supp.
1355, 1362 (D. Or. 1996).
8. See infra Part II.B.3. The website emulated the files compiled on Nazi officers
following World War II.
9. See infra Part II.B.3.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1996). See infra Part lI.B. for further discussion.
11. See infra Part II.B.4.
12. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. ACLA, 290 F.3d
1058, 1079 (9th Cir. 2002).
13. See Berlin, supra note 3, at 1 (listing a number of "thorny" issues presented by
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doubt as to the complexity of the issues presented by Planned
Parenthoodis quickly dispelled upon looking at the progression of the
case through the Ninth Circuit. At each stage, the issue of how the
ACLA's materials should be properly analyzed ultimately decided the
case's outcome. 4 In the end, a sharply divided en banc panel of the
Ninth Circuit declared that the ACLA's materials constituted a true
threat under FACE and reinstated the jury verdict. 5
Critics of the Ninth Circuit's decision to enjoin the posters and
website and award damages assert that the materials clearly fall within
the established bounds of protected speech and claim that the
injunction unnecessarily chills First Amendment rights. For example,
Professors Richards and Calvert maintain that "the powerful nature of
the First Amendment lies in safeguarding minority viewpoints, which
at times can be distasteful to mainstream society but should co-exist to
ensure a vigorous national discourse."1 6 If we are to remain true to
the principles underlying the First Amendment and the goals it
promotes, the argument goes, the political commentary and dissent
expressed by these pro-life groups must be protected, regardless of
whether the masses adhere to the position they are lobbying or not. 7
Surprisingly, a number of civil libertarians known for their fervent
advocacy in the name of First Amendment rights have supported the
jury verdict.1 8
While acknowledging that the actual language
embodied in the Wanted posters and Nuremberg Files website is
clearly protected by the First Amendment, the proponents of the
verdict express their objections to the message conveyed on the
posters and website.
The issue of whether or not the ACLA's materials were worthy of
First Amendment protection was further complicated by the fact that
Planned Parenthood).
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. PlannedParenthood,290 F.3d at 1058.
16. Calvert & Richards, supra note 3, at 291.
17. As stated by Professor Redish: "It is a hallmark of our free society that we
tolerate all viewpoints, even those of 'fringe' elements, who advocate illegal conduct,
so long as they present no real threat to society. Only a danger of true harm justifies
curtailing the flow of free and open discourse." Martin H. Redish, Freedom of
Expression: A Critical Analysis 187-88 (1984).
18. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, The Nuremberg Files and the FirstAmendment Value
of Threats, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 541, 542-43 (2000) (discussing the accepting reaction of
civil libertarians to the jury verdict, despite their usual position advocating
protection); Daniel T. Kobil, Advocacy on the Line: Brandenburg v. Ohio and Speech
in the Internet Era, 31 U. Tol. L. Rev. 227, 230 (2000) (observing that the
overwhelming majority of his students believe that the Nuremberg Files website
should be subject to government sanctions, representing a marked divergence from
the liberal reactions usually voiced by students); Dennis Byrne, Cleaning Up Cultural
Waste, Chi.-Sun Times, June 16, 1999, at 41, available at 1999 WL 6543959; Ira
Glasser, Letter to the Editor, Murder Threats Are Not 'Free Speech,' Wall St. J., Feb.
17, 1999, at A23 (Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union),
availableat 1999 WL-WSJ 5441035.

1286

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

the implicit threats were interwoven into the ACLA's political
expression. The Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that speech
involving political debate or public issues occupies "the highest rung
of the hierarchy of First Amendment values,"19 and is therefore
awarded special protection.20 Despite this well-established principle,
heated debate erupted over whether the ACLA's materials constitute
true threats or incitement to unlawful action due to the divergent
levels of First Amendment protection provided by each doctrine.
While the Court established its defining precedents proscribing both
categories of speech within two months of one another, the speech
analyzed under the doctrines has received divergent treatment and
different levels of protection in the years that followed. 2' Many First
Amendment scholars have hailed the Court's modern incitement
doctrine for its rigorous protection of First Amendment concerns.22
The true threats doctrine, on the other hand, has endured great
criticism for failing to provide the level of First Amendment
protection intended by the Court.23 Much of this criticism stems from
the development of true threats jurisprudence in the lower courts. 4
With limited guidance provided by the Court, the lower courts have
played a significant role in shaping the adjudication of true threats.
The objective standard applied by lower courts analyzing alleged
threats has been vehemently chastised as failing to provide the
appropriate level of First Amendment protection.25
The issues involved in PlannedParenthoodbring the divergent First
Amendment protection afforded by the incitement and threats
doctrines to the forefront. In particular, the ACLA's materials
illuminate the inherent difficulties in analyzing implicit threats under
the existing test. Those difficulties are further compounded when
expressions of political debate or matters of public concern
accompany the alleged threats.
The debate and controversy
surrounding Planned Parenthoodsignals a need to revise true threats
jurisprudence to cure its deficiencies.
This Note proposes that the inadequacies associated with the true
threats doctrine could be remedied by adopting a different standard
for evaluating implicit threats embedded in expressions of political
debate or matters of public concern. This new standard imports the
public-private dichotomy developed in the constitutionalization of
defamation and calls for a balance between First Amendment and
competing fundamental rights.
Applying the public-private
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, Co., 458 U.S. 886,913 (1982).
See, e.g., infra notes 41-43, 63, 101, 112, 179 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
See infra Parts II.A.2.a., II.A.2.b., II.A.3.
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distinction would assist courts in distinguishing true threats from
protected speech, particularly when the alleged threats are expressed
implicitly and are accompanied by political debate or matters of
public concern. This standard embodies the premise that political
debate does not generally target private individuals. A speaker
expressing an alleged threat targeting a private individual should be
required to show that the defense of political debate or matters of
public concern is more than a mere pretext before the statement is
awarded the highest level of First Amendment protection. Speech not
involving political debate or matters of public concern does not
receive the same level of special protection given to political speech.
Accordingly, if a court deems a claim of political debate or matter of
public concern as pretextual, the competing fundamental rights of the
targeted individual should be considered.
Part I provides an overview of the principles underlying the First
Amendment freedom of speech and the reasons for safeguarding this
fundamental right. It then examines the Supreme Court's efforts to
strike an appropriate balance between First Amendment and
competing fundamental rights in the areas of defamation, privacy and
public employment. Part II discusses incitement of unlawful advocacy
and true threats jurisprudence, including the evolution of both
doctrines and the divergent level of First Amendment protection each
currently affords. Next, it presents the facts of Planned Parenthood
and traces the controversial case's progression through the Ninth
Circuit. Part III proposes adopting a new standard for the evaluation
of true threats, which imports the public-private dichotomy developed
in the constitutionalization of defamation and calls for a balance
between First Amendment and competing fundamental rights similar
to the balance invoked by the Supreme Court in several areas of the
law. It then applies this standard to Planned Parenthood.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT AND COMPETING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Freedom of speech, as guaranteed by the First Amendment, is a
cornerstone of our democracy and has been a championed right of our
citizens since the Bill of Rights was enacted.26 Several principles have
been identified as the underlying reasons for advancing, cherishing
and safeguarding free speech: realization of autonomy and selffulfillment; 7 fostering the discovery of knowledge and truth in the
26. Kent Greenawalt has stated that a fundamental premise of all "Western"
governments is a minimal principle of liberty: "[T]he government should not prohibit
people from acting as they wish unless it has a positive reason to do so." Kent
Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, & the Uses of Language 9 (1989). This principle
translates into affording special protection to speech "by establishing a special value
for speech" and placing prohibitions "at odds with how human beings should be
regarded or with the proper role of government." Id. at 10-11.
27. Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 6-7 (1970).
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marketplace of ideas; 2 promoting self-government and representative
democracy; 29 and creating "a more adaptable and hence a more stable
community."3 The power that free speech wields is exemplified by
the decisive role it has played in many of our nation's major
movements, including Civil Rights, Women's Rights, environmental,
anti-war and labor.3 '
The purposes and principles underlying the First Amendment have
secured its position as a cherished fundamental right. Freedom of
expression is firmly rooted in our sense of democracy and selfautonomy.3 2 The vast protection afforded to a broad range of
language and expression exemplifies the level to which our society
The commitment of the courts to
values freedom of speech.
safeguarding free speech to the greatest extent is evident in the
aversion to applying a "balancing" test in the adjudication of First
Amendment rights. 33 This objection stems from the subjective and
unpredictable nature inherent in balancing ill-defined categories on an
ad hoc basis.34
While refraining from employing balancing tests promotes
expansive First Amendment protection, problems arise when First
Amendment rights are in direct competition with other fundamental
rights.35 For example, when a speaker's expression involves another
individual, the speaker's First Amendment right may conflict with the
individual's right to reputation. When fundamental values are at odds

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 7. See also Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 16-34; Redish, supra note 17, at
9-86; S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Recalibrating the
Cost of Harm Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 Wm.& Mary L. Rev.
1159, 1173-74 (2000) (comparing the First Amendment to a "social safety valve,"
allowing the disgruntled to vent without resorting to violence); Michael Vitiello, The
Nuremberg Files: Testing the Outer Limits of the FirstAmendment, 61 Ohio St. L.J.
1175, 1221 (2000).
31. See Berlin, supra note 3, at 26; Volokh, supra note 3.
32. See supra notes 26-30.
33. See Redish, supra note 17, at 226 (observing that the aversion to a balancing
tests was a distinctive feature of both the Warren Court's liberal branch and those
traditionally protectionist of free speech interests); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L.J. 943, 952-58 (1987)
(considering possible explanations for the Supreme Court's move towards balancing
in its constitutional methodology).
34. See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment
54-56 (1966) (highlighting the difficulties and drawbacks of the ad hoc balancing test);
Redish, supra note 17, at 54, 226.
35. See Lee C. Bollinger, Images of a Free Press 24-25 (1991) (noting that the
most obvious criticism of the extensive protection afforded to the press is that it
imposes too great a sacrifice of social interests); Emerson, supra note 34, at 66-88
(discussing conflict with personal interests, such as reputation, fair trial, and privacy
and social interests, including consensus and efficiency, preservation of internal order
and national security).
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with one another, courts must strike a proper balance that respects
both rights in accordance with the Constitution.36
This part examines several areas of the law in which the Supreme
Court has recognized the existence of competing rights. Part I.A.
discusses the Court's consideration of the right to reputation
throughout the constitutionalization of defamation. Part I.B. looks at
the Court's efforts to balance First Amendment concerns competing
with an individual's right to privacy. Part I.C. reviews the Court's
efforts to create a proper balance of First Amendment concerns
within the scope of public employment. An overview of the Court's
evaluation of competing rights within these areas imparts a sense of
how the factors and considerations at issue are balanced.
A. The Constitutionalizationof Defamation: New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan and Its Progeny
The constitutionalization of defamation law was set in motion in

1964 with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.37 L.B. Sullivan, one of
three elected Commissioners of the City of Montgomery, Alabama,
alleged that he had been libeled by a full-page advertisement about
the Civil Rights movement that ran in the New York Times.38 In its
landmark decision, the Supreme Court held the Alabama State law
constitutionally deficient for failing to provide the safeguards for
freedom of speech and of the press, as required by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.3 9 The Court further held that in order for a
public official to recover damages in a claim of defamatory falsehood

36. See Redish, supra note 17, at 55 ("Although the first amendment cannot
practically be interpreted to provide absolute protection, the constitutional language
and our political and social traditions dictate that the first amendment right must give
way only in the presence of a truly compelling government interest."); Joseph F.
Schuster, The First Amendment in the Balance 2-3 (1992). Today, balancing no
longer spawns heated debate, as the Supreme Court has applied the approach to a
number of areas in constitutional law and academics have recognized its capacity to
produce both liberal and conservative results. See Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 944.
37. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Prior to this time, libel and defamation were viewed as
unprotected by the First Amendment. See Emerson, supra note 27, at 524 ("The
Court unanimously agreed that libel laws would have to be brought into conformity
with the system of freedom of expression.").
38. N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 256-57. The advertisement, entitled "Heed Their
Rising Voices," appeared in the March 29, 1960 issue of the New York Times and
described the "wave of terror" encountered by non-violent Civil Rights
demonstrators. Id. at 257. Even though Sullivan's name was not mentioned anywhere
in the advertisement, he claimed that the allegation against the police was imputed to
him because of his position. Id. at 258.
Following the publication, it was
acknowledged that several of the events described in the advertisement contained
inaccuracies. Id. at 258-59.
39. Id. at 264. The Supreme Court of Alabama had ruled that the statements
were "libelous per se" and that they were "of and concerning" Sullivan. Id. at 263; see
Bollinger, supra note 35, at 2 (describing New York Times as "the fullest, richest
articulation of the central image of freedom of the press" for the modern era).
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relating to his official conduct, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove
that the statement was made with actual malice.40
The Court considered the matter "against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials."4 1 Writing for the Court,
Justice Brennan maintained that imposing this heightened burden of
proof on public officials was driven by the well-established principle
that the First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people."42 Allowing recovery by public
officials absent a showing of actual malice would result in selfcensorship by would-be critics inconsistent with the spirit and goals of
the First Amendment.4 3 In adopting the actual malice standard, the
Court allocated the cost of errors in favor of publication rather than
silence.'
The Supreme Court tackled the burden of proof that should be
imposed on public figures three years later in Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts.45 In a plurality opinion, the Court concluded that a public
figure who was not a public official would be entitled to recover
damages for a defamatory falsehood, the substance of which makes
substantial danger to reputation apparent, only "on a showing of
highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from
40. N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. "Actual malice" was defined as "knowledge
that [the statement] was false or made with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not." Id. at 280. The Court found that the evidence offered by Sullivan was
"constitutionally insufficient" to support a judgment in his favor. Id. at 265.
41. Id. at 270; see Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the
Foundationsand Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 1275, 1360 (1998)
(maintaining that "[f]rom a rights based perspective, New York Times was clearly
correct to resolve the conflict strongly in favor of speech").
42. N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957)).
43. Id. at 279. Therefore, "constitutional protection does not turn upon 'the truth,
popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered."' Id. at 271
(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963)). The Court recognized that
certain false statements made a valuable contribution to public debate, by
contributing to the emergence of ideas and truth. Id. at 279 n.19; see Bollinger, supra
note 35, at 6-7 (noting that New York Times and its progeny embody the premise that
while regulating false speech is acceptable, as it does not possess constitutional value,
extending protection to certain falsehoods is necessary to promote the free exchange
of ideas and truthful information); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight:
A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 291, 312-13
(1983) (same).
44. See Robert M. O'Neil, The First Amendment and Civil Liability 26 (2001)
(pointing out that while a large judgment in favor of a plaintiff may not cripple a
publisher of the New York Times's stature, it could send a smaller publisher or other
form of media into financial ruin).
45. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Butts, an athletic director at the University of Georgia,
was allegedly involved with fixing a football game. Id. at 135.
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the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by

responsible publishers. '46 In his concurrence, Chief Justice Warren
asserted that he would have extended the New York Times rule to
encompass public figures as well.47
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.4" marked the influence of New York

Times in the realm of defamation claims brought by private
individuals and solidified the distinction between "public" and
"private" individuals. Gertz was an attorney representing a Chicago

police officer accused of involvement in a Communist campaign to

discredit local law enforcement agencies. 49 American Opinion, a
monthly magazine., published a story alleging that Gertz was the chief
architect of the "frame-up" of the officer and linked him to

Communist activity." While the matter was of public concern, Gertz
was neither a public official nor a public figure.
Adopting the rationale set forth in Chief Justice Warren's
concurrence in Butts, the Gertz Court extended the actual malice
standard to encompass public figures." The Court justified imposing
this heightened standard on public figures on the grounds that both
public officials and figures have a more realistic opportunity to
counteract false statements than private individuals, as they typically
enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective
communication;5 2 society has a heightened interest in public officials
and figures; and by voluntarily
3 stepping into the public light, they

invite attention and comment.

Recognizing a dichotomy between public and private individuals,54

46. Id. at 155.
47. Id. at 162-64.
48. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
49. Id. at 325-26.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 348-49. According to Heyman, this extension of the New York Times
rule was reasonable in terms of a rights-based approach. Heyman, supra note 41, at
1362.
52. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
53. Id. at 344-45. The Court further recognizes the difference between a
"general" and "limited" or "special purpose" public figure. See Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ'ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287
(D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Schuster, supra note 36, at 227 (maintaining that taking
Gertz and Firestonetogether appears to grant private individuals the ability to sue for
libel without being held to the New York Times or any intermediate standard);
Vitiello, supra note 30, at 1222 n.352 (stating that "[t]he effect of cases like Firestone
and Gertz is that a state retains broad power to protect private citizens from harm
while assuring vigorous public debate").
54. Because private individuals generally do not have access to the media and
have not voluntarily stepped into the public eye, the Court stated they were "more
vulnerable to injury" and "also more deserving of recovery." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
See Victor C. Romero, Restricting Hate Speech Against "Private Figures": Lessons in
Power-Based Censorshipfrom Defamation Law, 33 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1, 22
(2001) (maintaining that the distinction between private and public figures "hints at
an underlying egalitarian concept: that self-help may not be as effective for private
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the Court set out to resolve the competing First Amendment interests
and the State's "strong and legitimate ... interest in compensating
private individuals for injury to reputation."5 5 The Court asserted that
extending New York Times to apply to private individuals, as
suggested by the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc.,56 would amount to an unacceptable abridgement of the State's
interest in protecting the reputation of its citizens.57 The Court
concluded by holding that, so long as the States did not impose
liability without fault, they were free to determine the appropriate
standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster when the
defamatory falsehood injured a private individual.5 8 When the
statements involved a matter of public concern, however, First
Amendment concerns commanded that the private individual show
actual malice in order to recover awards of presumed and punitive
damages.5 9
The Supreme Court refined the nature of this balance in Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,6 holding that the First
Amendment concerns advanced in New York Times and Gertz did not
outweigh the state's interest in providing adequate protection for its
citizens when the defamation did not address a matter of public
concern.61 Greenmoss filed suit against Dun & Bradstreet, a creditreporting agency, pursuant to Dun & Bradstreet sending a report to
five subscribers, which contained gross misstatements of Greenmoss's
assets and liabilities.62

figures who have achieved less societal prominence and have less access to media").
55. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348-49.
56. 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971).
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion advocated
extending the New York Times rule to apply to any "allegedly defamatory publication
concern[ing] a matter of public or general interest," regardless of whether the subject
was a public official, public figure or private individual. See id. at 79 (Marshall, J.
dissenting). The Court's retreat from Rosenbloom's "general or public interest" test
reflected its position that an ad hoc determination of whether an issue was of "general
or public interest" imposed an unnecessary burden on judges and such a
determination would not serve either of the competing interests adequately. Gertz,
418 U.S. at 346; Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils
of an Emerging FirstAmendment Category,59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 11-12 (1990).
57. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346. According to Heyman, "[b]ecause [the] rights [of free
speech and reputation] are of the same order of value, it was reasonable for Gertz to
hold that defendants may be held responsible for injury to reputation when they are
at fault, that is, when they fail to use reasonable care to determine whether a
defamatory statement is actually true." Heyman, supra note 41, at 1364.
58. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
59. Id. at 349. The Court considered this an equitable balance, as it allowed a
private individual to be compensated for actual injury while "shield[ing] the press and
broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability for defamation." Id. at 347-48.
60. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
61. Id. at 763. The Court recognized the line between matters of public and
private concerns with regard to recovery of punitive damages, despite eschewing this
line in Rosenbloom. See supra note 56.
62. Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 751-52.
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In considering whether the Gertz rule applied to issues not of public

concern, the Court stressed that it "has frequently reaffirmed that
speech on public issues occupies 'the highest rung of the hierarchy of

First Amendment values,' and is entitled to special protection."63 As

defamatory statements targeting private individuals about issues not
of public concern do not threaten robust and wide-open political
debate, state interests overshadow First Amendment concerns: "In
light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no

matters of public concern, we hold that the state interest adequately
supports awards of presumed and punitive damages-even absent a
showing of 'actual malice. ' ' '6 The Gertz holding marked a concession
of First Amendment rights to a competing fundamental individual
right where such a concession did not pose a threat to political debate
or matters of public concern.65
B. Right of Privacy

Balancing First Amendment rights with competing State interests is
not unique to defamation. Frustrated by invasive press tactics,
increasingly prevalent gossip columns and "yellow journalism"
fostered by emerging technology, two young lawyers, Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis, urged the courts to recognize a new right under
the common law-the "right to be let alone" or the "right to
6 7 the
privacy."" Attributed"661with the birth of the right to privacy,
Warren/Brandeis article is regarded as "perhaps the most influential

63. Id. at 759 (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913
(1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,467 (1980)).
64. Id. at 761; see O'Neil, supra note 44, at 29 (stating that this retreat reflected
the emergence of unintended consequence following the privilege created in New
York Times, which "had done more harm than good to public service and public
discourse"); Malloy & Krotoszynski, supra note 30, at 1187 ("Careful consideration of
Sullivan and its progeny demonstrates that the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment displaces traditional common law tort principles only when necessary to
protect democratic deliberation.").
65. While reputation is not a constitutional right, it has been held to be a
fundamental right under a natural rights theory. See Heyman, supra note 41, at 133640 (discussing views on the right to reputation by leading scholars in the natural rights
tradition); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation
and the Constitution, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 691, 699-707 (1986) (discussing the right to
reputation as a concept of honor).
66. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev.
193, 195-96 (1890); see Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since
Warren and Brandeis, 39 Cath. U. L. Rev. 703, 705-06 (1990) (discussing the limited
protection and remedies available to victims of privacy invasion prior to formal
recognition of a right to privacy).
67. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 66, at 703. In lobbying for broader recognition
for the right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis relied primarily on English precedents,
rooted in concepts of intellectual property and contract law. Warren & Brandeis,
supra note 66, at 195-211; see also Kramer, supra note 66, at 710-14.
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law journal piece ever published."6 8 In advocating the need to enhance
protection of individual privacy, the authors acknowledged that the
right was not absolute and advanced four limitations to curtail
intrusion on the press's free speech.69
Since its inception,7" the right of privacy has experienced continuous
attention and development in the face of increasing technology and
media coverage."
The majority of jurisdictions adhere to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts's formulation that one who publicizes
a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability for
invasion of his privacy if disclosure of the matter would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person and is not of legitimate concern to
the public.7 ' The rule that the disclosed information consists of
legitimate public concern, or newsworthiness, has been universally
applied by courts and broadly read to ensure that the public's right to
be informed on matters of public interest and the media's right to free
press will not be chilled by fear of liability.7 3
68. P. Allan Dionisopoulos & Craig R. Ducat, The Right to Privacy 20 (1976)
(discussing the Warren and Brandeis article).
69. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 66, at 214-19. The limitations stated that the
right to privacy would not prohibit publications relating to a matter of public or
general interest; would not prohibit publications, while private in nature, which would
be considered a privileged communication under the laws of libel and slander; would
not allow for recovery from an oral publication absent the showing of special
damages; and would cease to exist upon an individual's publication of the facts, or his
consent to do so. Id. It has been argued, however, that the tort cannot coexist with
constitutional freedoms of speech and press. See Zimmerman, supra note 43, at 29394.
70. By 1939, the courts' reception to the right of privacy was so vast that the
American Law Institute codified it in the Restatement of Torts. Restatement of Torts
§ 867 (1939).
71. The right of privacy has since evolved to be recognized as four separate torts:
(1) "unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another"; (2) "appropriation of the
other's name or likeness"; (3) "unreasonable publicity given to the other's private
life"; and (4) "publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the
public." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A (1977); see Martin E. Halstuk,
Shielding Private Lives from Prying Eyes:
The Escalating Conflict Between
Constitutional Privacy and the Accountability Principle of Democracy, 1 CommLaw
Conspectus 71, 72 (2003); Kramer, supra note 66, at 724. But see Zimmerman, supra
note 43, at 296-99 (maintaining that the broad expansion of situations encompassed
by the "'right to privacy"' by courts and legislatures bears "little resemblance to those
encompassed in the vague Warren-Brandeis formulation").
72. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977); see Patrick J. McNulty, The
Public Disclosureof Private Facts: There is Life After Florida Star, 50 Drake L. Rev.
93, 99 (2001) (noting that the four elements of the tort-publicity, private facts,
offensiveness and newsworthiness-are often scrutinized separately by courts);
Zimmerman, supra note 43, at 299-303. With regard to publicity, most courts follow
the Restatement's comments, requiring the information at issue be communicated "to
the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge." Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652D cmt. a. Conversely, the minority requires that the plaintiff show that he
has a special relationship with the public to whom the information was disclosed in
order to fulfill the publicity requirement. See McNulty, supra at 100-01.
73. See McNulty, supra note 72, at 106-09; Zimmerman, supra note 43, at 299-300.
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Asserting the right to privacy often materializes as a direct
challenge to free speech. While the elements of the public disclosure

tort limit the amount of protection it affords, the right to privacy has
been classified as one of society's fundamental rights.74

Thus, the

conflict between the right to privacy and the right to free speech is
significant, as both are considered fundamental values of our society.
Jurisprudence in this area of the law has attempted to create a proper
balance between the competing rights.75
The established balance between the right to privacy and the right
to free press endured a substantial transformation with the Supreme
Court's creation of a new constitutional principle for the public
disclosure privacy tort in Florida Star v. B.J.F.76 B.J.F., a robbery and
rape victim, brought suit against the Florida Star for violating a
Florida statute making it unlawful to print, publish or broadcast the
name of a victim of a sexual offense.7 7 After being attacked by an
unknown assailant, B.J.F. reported the incident to the Sheriff's
Department ("Department")." A reporter-trainee for the Florida

Star copied the police report from the Department's pressroom,
including B.J.F.'s full name, which was then printed in the "Robbery"
subsection of the Florida Star's "Police Reports" section.79 The

The private facts requirement bars recovery for disclosure of facts already in the
public domain. This was confirmed by the Supreme Court's refusal to impose liability
for the publication of a rape victim's name obtained from records open to public
inspection and related to a criminal prosecution in Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469, 497 (1975). The offensive element of the tort means, in essence, "only the
most serious transgressions of privacy are deemed worthy of remedy." McNulty,
supra note 72, at 104; see Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy:
Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 957, 984 (1989)
(maintaining that social norms govern which revelations are considered
inappropriate).
74. See Halstuk, supra note 71, at 71 ("The rise of American privacy law over the
years reflects the profound importance of this fundamental value in modem
society."); Heyman, supra note 41, at 1332-33 (discussing the reasons that privacy is
considered a fundamental right); Kramer, supra note 66, at 724 (observing that the
right to privacy "has earned a prominent place in American jurisprudence and is now
regarded as one of society's most fundamental values"); Post, supra note 73, at 958-68
(discussing the tort in terms of civility).
75. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring); id.
at 541 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring); id at 542 (White., J., dissenting); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g
Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 469; see also McNulty, supra
note 72, at 94 ("Courts endeavored for years to reconcile and balance the competing
values represented by an individual's right to privacy and the public's right to
know."); Post, supra note 73, at 967 (discussing the plaintiff's interests involved in the
privacy tort).
76. 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 542 (White, J.,
dissenting). See McNulty, supra note 72, at 110.
77. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 526-27. B.J.F. also brought suit against the Department,
but they settled prior to the trial. Id. at 528.
78. Id. at 527.
79. Id.
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publication also violated the Florida Star's internal policy of not
publishing the names of assault victims.8 °
At trial, B.J.F. testified that she had heard about the article from
co-workers and acquaintances, that her mother had received several
phone calls from a man threatening to rape B.J.F. again and that these
events resulted in the need for her to change her phone number and
residence, seek police protection and obtain mental health
counseling.8' The Florida Star's defense included evidence that it had
obtained B.J.F.'s name from the report released by the Department
and that violation of its internal rule was unintentional.8 2 The trial
court entered judgment in favor of B.J.F. and the District Court of
Appeal of Florida affirmed.8 3
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that whether an individual's
right to privacy outweighed a newspaper's First Amendment rights
had to be determined on the facts of the case, rather than by a broad
sweeping rule.' 4 The Court's reluctance to formulate a broad holding
"[r]espect[ed] the fact that press freedom and privacy rights are both
'plainly rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our
society."' 85 In the eyes of the Court, the commission and investigation
of a violent crime constituted a "matter of paramount public
import."" The Court further held that "where a newspaper publishes
truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may
lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state
interest of the highest order."87 Because Florida Star had lawfully
obtained the information from a government source, thereby having a
80. Id. at 528.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 528-29. The Supreme Court of Florida denied review. Id.
84. Id. at 532-33.
85. Id. at 533 (quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975)). See
id. at 551 (White, J.,dissenting) (faulting the majority for attributing too little weight
to B.J.F.'s side of the equation, and too much to the other, in its attempt to reach a
balance); Bollinger, supra note 35, at 26 (questioning whether a Court more sensitive
to the privacy issues involved would have attributed such a low value to the State's
interest); McNulty, supra note 72, at 125 (maintaining that the Court offered no
discussion or consideration of B.J.F.'s privacy rights).
86. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 536-37. See McNulty, supra note 72, at 111-12 (observing
that the Court held public significance was determined by the general subject matter,
rather than consideration of whether the plaintiff's identity was a matter of public
interest and noting that no attempt to justify whether the disclosure of B.J.F.'s
identity contributed to the public significance of the story); Schuster, supra note 36, at
231 (commenting that none of the three opinions even eluded to the question of how
including the victim's name "reveals anything particularly relevant to the selfgoverning function").
87. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 541. The Court invoked the strict scrutiny test as
articulated in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979). Id. at 54041. In his dissent, Justice White charged that by invoking this standard, the majority
rule will inevitably "obliterate one of the most noteworthy legal inventions of the 20
century." Id. at 550 (White, J., dissenting).
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right to assume publication was lawful, and reporting the crime was a
matter of public concern, the Court found that no such interest was
served by imposing liability under the Florida statute in this particular
case.88 In closing, the Court noted that a different outcome could be
reached on a different set of facts.8 9
While Florida Star appeared to suggest that it would be virtually
impossible for an individual's right to privacy to outweigh First
Amendment concerns when the information was lawfully obtained
and involved a matter of public concern, 9° Bartnicki v. Vopper9"
embraced a more equitable balance of the competing rights. The case
arose out of an intercepted cell phone conversation, during which
Kane, president of a local teacher's union, informed his chief
negotiator, Bartnicki, that if the school board did not meet their
demands they were "gonna have to go to their, their homes ...[t]o
blow off their front porches." 92 The conversation had been illegally
intercepted by an unknown person and passed along to school board
members and Vopper, a local broadcaster. 93 Bartnicki and Kane
claimed that by airing the tape on his radio show, Vopper had violated
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) and the analogous Pennsylvania statute. 94
In its endeavor to strike a balance between First Amendment and
88. Id. at 541. The Court supported its ruling by pointing to other means through
which the State could preserve the secrecy of a sexual assault victim's identity and
asserting that requiring the press to determine whether publicly released information
was in fact legally publishable posed a threat of self-censorship. Id. at 540-41; see
Heyman, supra note 41, at 1365 (observing that the statute's aim was not to promote
state interests, but to protect the rights of victims); McNulty, supra note 72, at 115
("The message of Florida Star is clear and unambiguous: timidity and fear of selfcensorship by the press in reporting the news of the day is to be avoided at nearly all
costs.").
89. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 541. If, for example, Florida Star had obtained the
information unlawfully, the Court may not have found it constitutionally protected
speech. Id.
90. See Smith, 443 U.S. at 102 (stating generally that "state action to punish the
publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards").
91. 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 541 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
92. Id. at 518-19.
93. Id. at 519.
94. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) provides that:
any person who intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to
any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, knowing or having reason to know that the
information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral,
or electronic communication in violation of this subsection;...
shall be punished ....
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) (2001). The Pennsylvania statute contains a similar provision.
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5725(a) (1988); see Timothy P. Terrell & Anne R. Jacobs, Privacy,
Technology, & Terrorism: Bartnicki, Kyllo, and the Normative Struggle Behind
Competing Claims to Solitude and Security, 51 Emory L.J. 1469, 1484 (2002) (noting
that in cases like Bartnicki, the parties are generally in agreement as to the facts and
legal issues and the dispute centers around how their competing rights should be
valued).
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privacy rights, the Supreme Court considered the purposes underlying
the statute." The government maintained that the statute furthered
two interests: to remove the incentive for parties to intercept private
conversations and to minimize the harm to people whose
conversations have been illegally intercepted.96 The Court rejected
the contention that imposing liability on the disseminator of the
information of public interest that they had lawfully obtained would
deter illegal interception of private conversations.9 7
The Court was much more receptive to the government's second
argument, recognizing that "[p]rivacy of communication is an
important interest" and that "the fear of public disclosure of private
conversations might well have a chilling effect on private speech."98
Acknowledging that the disclosure of information may present a
greater intrusion on privacy than the interception itself, the Court
conceded that there was a valid independent justification for imposing
liability for a person disclosing lawfully obtained information, even if
that liability would not hinder the interceptions from occurring. 99
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens maintained that the case
invoked "the core purposes of the First Amendment" and concluded
that "privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in
publishing matters of public importance." 1" The Court held that
where the person publishing the information was not involved in its
illegal acquisition, but had obtained the information through lawful
means, and where the conversation pertained to a public issue,
imposing liability violated the First Amendment. 101
95. See James C. Goodale, 'Bartnicki': Publish News That's Private but True?,
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 3, 2001, at 3 (observing that Bartnicki was the first time the Court held
that there is a right of privacy that may punish publication of truthful facts).
96. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529. Because the statute involved the fundamental right
of free speech, the Supreme Court applied the strict scrutiny standard of review,
rather than the intermediate scrutiny applied by the Pennsylvania courts. Id. at 52628. To survive strict scrutiny, the government must prove that the regulation is
closely related to a compelling government interest and that the regulation achieves
its intended purpose by the least restrictive means possible. See Smith v. Daily Mail
Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979); Halstuk, supra note 71, at 86-87 n.220; see also
McNulty, supra note 72, at 133 (maintaining that by balancing two interests of the
highest order, the Court strayed from the constitutional ground broken in FloridaStar
and returned to the common law balancing approach).
97. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 530-31. The Court held that sufficient deterrence would
be achieved by imposing the appropriate sanctions. Id. at 529-30. Justice Stevens's
opinion noted that this was an exceptional case, as the actions of the interceptor were
not motivated by financial gain or public praise. Id. at 531.
98. Id. at 532-33.
99. Id. at 533.
100. Id. at 533-34; see Jesse A. Mudd, Right to Privacy v. Freedom of Speech: A
Review and Analysis of Bartnicki v. Vopper, 41 Brandeis L.J. 179, 195 (2002) (labeling
the public concern argument as weak because the intercepted conversation was
publicized after the labor dispute had been settled).
101. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535. Justice Breyer's concurrence summarized the
balance struck by the majority opinion:
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C. Freedom of Speech for Public Employees
The First Amendment rights within the scope of public employment
presents yet another area of law involving a clash between free speech
and competing fundamental rights. As late as 1952, the Supreme

Court's view that public employment was a privilege allowed the
government to place restrictions on employees without offending their

First Amendment rights." z The Court began to modify its position in
1952, but it was not until its landmark decision in Pickering v. Board
1" 3 that First Amendment
of Education
rights were extended to public

employees. 1°4

Marvin Pickering was a high school teacher dismissed following a
local newspaper's publication of his letter to the paper's editor, in
which Pickering attacked the Board of Education's handling of bond
issue proposals and allocation of financial resources. 1°5 The Supreme
Thus, in finding a constitutional privilege to publish unlawfully intercepted
conversations of the kind here at issue, the Court does not create a "public
interest" exception that swallows up the statutes' privacy-protecting general
rule. Rather, it finds constitutional protection for publication of intercepted
information of a special kind. Here, the speaker's legitimate privacy
expectations are unusually low, and the public interest in defeating those
expectations is unusually high.
Id. at 540; see Goodale, supra note 95 (asserting that Bartnicki raises more questions
than it answers on the conflict between the right to privacy and the right to publish);
Halstuck, supra note 71, at 90 (noting that while Bartnicki contributes to press rights
by considering liability stemming from the publication of private information
obtained by a nongovernmental source, the Court left two "overarching questions of
fundamental importance" unanswered: (1) whether the media can ever be punished
for publishing truthful information; and (2) whether the media has the right to publish
truthful information if it was involved in its unlawful acquisition).
102. As Justice Holmes stated: "[A policeman] may have a constitutional right to
talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v.
Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892); see Marcy S. Edwards et al.,
Freedom of Speech in the Public Workplace 27 (1998); D. Gordon Smith, Beyond
"Public Concern": New Free Speech Standards for Public Employees, 57 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 249, 250 (1990).
103. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
104. See Edwards, supra note 102, at 29 (observing that the balancing approach
adopted in Pickering remains the current standard); Tony M. Massaro, Significant
Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S.Cal. L. Rev. 1, 6
(1987) (identifying public employees as including employees of local, state or federal
governments, the judiciary, executive appointees, military personnel, public school
personnel, public university personnel, firefighters, police officers, postal workers and
welfare workers).
105. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566. In 1961, voters of the school district approved the
Board of Education's bond issue proposal to raise money for the construction of two
new schools. Id. at 565. In 1964 the Board submitted two proposals asking the voters
to increase the tax rate to be used for educational purposes, both of which were
defeated. Id. at 566. Prior to the second vote, a local newspaper had published letters
submitted by the Teachers' Organization and the superintendent asserting that failure
to adopt the proposal would result in a decline in the quality of education offered by
the district's schools. Id. In response to these letters and the second failed vote,
Pickering wrote a letter to the paper's editor, attacking the Board's handling of the
1961 bond issue proposals, its subsequent allocation of financial resources between
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Court identified its task as drawing the proper balance between
Pickering's interests as a citizen to comment on matters of public
concern and the State's interests, as an employer, to provide efficient
public services through its employees. 10 6 Due to the specific nature
and facts inherent in cases requiring such a balance, the Court
announced that its discussion would impart some general guidelines,
as opposed to a general standard, for evaluating such competing

interests. 107
The Court squarely rejected the Board's contention that the letter
compromised professional reputations and would cause conflict and
dissension among the Board, administrators and teachers, as the
criticisms were directly aimed at the allocation of funds and the
methods by which voters were informed of the district's need for
additional funding. The statements did not target any specific
members of the Board or individuals whom Pickering would come
into contact with through his employment.108 While the Court agreed
with the Board that certain portions of Pickering's letter contained
false statements, these statements reflected a difference of opinion as
to how funds should be allocated, which clearly concerned a matter of
public interest. 109 The Court emphasized that, as free and open debate
is essential to an informed voting process, the personal knowledge and
insight of teachers required that they retain the right to speak freely
about school operations without a fear that their views might
culminate in their termination."'
the schools' educational and athletic programs and the superintendent of schools'
efforts to thwart teachers in the district from opposing or criticizing the proposed
bond issue. Id.
106. Id. at 568. The Illinois courts reviewed the Board's proceedings to determine
whether the evidence offered supported the Board's conclusion that Pickering's
publication was "detrimental to the best interests of the schools." Id. at 566-67. Upon
reviewing the decision rendered by the Illinois courts, the Supreme Court stated that
the opinion appeared to suggest that in accepting their employment, teachers may
constitutionally be compelled to relinquish First Amendment rights to discuss matters
of public concern related to the operation of public schools in which they worked-a
premise which the Court had unequivocally rejected in a number of prior decisions.
Id. at 568 (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 569; see Richard Michael Fischl, Labor, Management, and the First
Amendment: Whose Rights Are These, Anyway?, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 729, 739 (1989)
(commenting that the Pickering balance suggests that only the State, not the
employee, "has a legally protected interest in the employment aspect of the
government/public employee relationship"); Massaro, supra note 104, at 13 (stating
that Pickering clarified the Court's position on the constitutional protections for
public employees speaking as citizens, but left the protections for employees speaking
as employees unresolved); Smith, supra note 102, at 251-52 (observing that the Court
rejected the two extreme approaches-the State's capacity to compel employees to
relinquish their First Amendment rights on one end of the spectrum, and employees
maintaining their free speech rights enjoyed as citizens on the other-in balancing the
rights at issue).
108. Pickering,391 U.S. at 569-70.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 571-72.
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The Court concluded that because Pickering's false statements
involved a matter of public concern and were not shown or presumed
to impede his capacity to perform as a teacher or interfere with the
daily operations of the schools, the Board's interest in limiting
Pickering's contribution to public debate was not significantly greater
than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by a member of the
general public. 1 ' Consistent with the premise that free and
uninhibited discussion of matters of public concern requires the
utmost First Amendment protection, the Court held that a public
employee's right to comment on matters of public concern may not
provide the basis for his termination from employment absent proof
that he made false statements knowingly or with reckless disregard of
the truth." 2
The Court revisited the First Amendment rights of a public
employee in Connick v. Myers."' Resisting a transfer, Sheila Myers,
an Assistant District Attorney in New Orleans, voiced her opposition
to several superiors and circulated a questionnaire to support her
contention that many of her concerns were widely shared throughout
the office.114 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that
Myers' questionnaire involved matters of public concern and that the
State had not "clearly demonstrated" that circulating the
questionnaire had "substantially interfered" with office operations." 5
Embarking on its challenge of striking the appropriate balance
between an employee's constitutional right to speak on matters of
public concern and the State's right, as an employer, to efficiently
serve the public through its employees, the Court reaffirmed its
commitment to awarding speech on matters of public concern special
attention, as it occupied the "highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values."' 16 If the speech could not be characterized as
involving a matter of public concern, however, the First Amendment
should not overshadow a government official's capacity to run the
management of his office with wide latitude." 7 The Court held,
111. Id. at 572-73. The Court noted that had a member of the general public
written the letter, the Board would have been held to the requirements of New York
Times. Id. at 573.
112. Id. at 574.
113. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
114. Id. at 140-41. The questionnaire sought to capture her co-workers views
regarding the office transfer policy, morale, the need for a grievance committee, the
level of confidence in supervisors, and if they had felt pressured to work in political
campaigns. Id. at 141. Following the distribution of the questionnaire, Connick
terminated Myers, citing her refusal to accept the transfer and her act of
insubordination (distributing the questionnaire) as the reasons supporting his
decision. Id. Myers filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that in exercising her
right to free speech, she had been wrongfully terminated. Id.
115. Id. at 142.
116. Id. at 145 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
117. Id. at 146. Professor Massaro has noted that the Court's "analysis of employee
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therefore, that when an employee's speech relates to a matter of
personal interest rather than a matter of public concern, absent the
most unusual circumstances, a public agency's personnel decision

allegedly reacting to an employee's behavior will not be subject to

judicial review."1 8

With the exception of one question, the Court found that the
subject of Myers' questionnaire did not constitute a matter of public
concern." 9 The questions were not intended to enhance the overall

efficiency, but to fortify Myers' resistance to her transfer. 2 ° Balancing
Myers'

First

Amendment

right

to

free

speech

against

the

government's interest in "the effective and efficient fulfillment of its
responsibilities to the public,"12' the Court gave deference to
Connick's decision that the insubordination manifested by Myers'
questionnaire
1
relationships.

22

posed a threat to efficiency

and close working

speech resembles its analysis of defamatory statements." Massaro, supra note 104, at
26. The "matter of public concern" requirement in public employee speech cases has
been criticized for being vague and subjective. See Estlund, supra note 56, at 50-51;
Massaro, supra note 104, at 27-33.
118. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. Fischl has interpreted "[m]atters of personal
interest" to mean "issues that involve the employment relationship between
government and public employee." Fischl, supra note 107, at 737 (emphasis omitted).
According to Fischl, protection for speech relating to such a topic is likely to be
denied, even when the speech may arguably "'touch on a matter of public concern."'
Id. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.8); see Estlund, supra note 56, at 8 (arguing
that the public concern test formulated in Connick "recast the Pickering balance:
What was, in Pickering, the announced purpose for protecting.., employee speech
became the minimum threshold for gaining protection in Connick").
119. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-49. The Court held that whether the employee's
speech addresses a matter of public concern "must be determined by the content,
form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." Id. at 14748.
120. Id. at 148.
121. Id. at 150.
122. Id. at 151-52. In holding that Myers's termination did not offend the First
Amendment, the Court emphasized that it was in no way creating a general standard
against which such statements should be judged. Id. at 154. Fischl summarizes the
implications of the Connick holding:
In sum, then, when the employee "does politics," she can be viewed as a
citizen legitimately involved in collective self-governance, and the
government cannot silence her through the use of her vulnerability as an
employee. But when the citizen speaks out about work, we view her as a
mere employee, and she ceases to have any self-governance interest at all.
Fischl, supra note 107, at 740. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan stated the
Court's decision was flawed on three grounds: (1) distorting the balancing analysis
required by Pickering by weighing the context in which the employee's statement was
made twice; (2) narrowing the subject matter on which a public employee could
express his views without the fear of retaliation; and (3) misapplying the Pickering
balancing test in holding Myers's dismissal for circulating a questionnaire addressing
at least one subject of public concern was constitutional without any evidence that
Myers's conduct disrupted the efficient functioning of the office. Connick, 461 U.S. at
157-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Massaro, supra note 104, at 18-19, 24 (discussing
obstacles to an employee's success on a free speech claim and arguing that Connick
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The First Amendment rights of public employees, like defamation

and the right to privacy, mark an area of the law in which the Supreme
Court deemed it necessary to balance First Amendment concerns with
competing fundamental rights. While precedents in each of these
areas have set forth guidelines to assist lower courts in striking an
appropriate balance between competing rights, the Court has
refrained from establishing standards to evaluate such interests. 23 As
Professor Heyman has articulated, "the rights at issue should be

delineated by applying the general concept of the right to the
particular facts, or (what amounts to the same thing) by viewing
specific facts in light of the general concept." 124 Academics consider
this approach to balancing as providing the appropriate intermediate
level between absolutism on one extreme and ad hoc balancing on the

other. 125
imparts ample protection to public employers); Paul Ferris Solomon, Note, The
Public Employee's Right to Free Speech: A Proposalfor a Fresh Start, 55 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 449, 468 (1986) (asserting that the Connick holding unjustifiably tips the
Pickering balance in favor of the employer).
123. As explained by Craig R. Ducat, this approach to the balancing of interests
proceeds on a case-by-case basis, eventually producing common principles as to how
competing interests will be treated. Craig R. Ducat, Modes of Constitutional
Interpretation 121 (1978). Future cases allow for these principles to be reconsidered,
refined, abandoned or "qualified as varying fact situations in cases provoke
modifications as to how certain interests will be treated under peculiar conditions."
Id; see Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: The
Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 Yale L.J. 1, 13 (1987) (observing that varying
circumstances will affect the weights assigned to interests and the balance expressed
in the general rule).
124. Heyman, supra note 41, at 1357. Heyman characterizes this valuation of rights
as a reflection of human liberty and self-determination: "The aim of this approach is
to harmonize the competing rights by protecting both insofar as possible and, to the
extent that they conflict, by protecting the right that (at the margin) constitutes the
most important aspect of liberty." Id. at 1356. Heyman explains that this approach is
fundamentally different from a generalized weighing of social interests and supports a
restriction on speech only when such restriction is necessary to protect another right,
which emerges as more valuable as an aspect of freedom under the circumstances. Id.;
see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 193-94 (1977) (recognizing the need to
balance competing rights). Ducat notes that "considerable leeway" often exists under
this scheme and judges confronted with novel issues typically justify the precedent
upon which their decision ultimately rests in terms of an analogy. Ducat, supra note
123, at 122-23.
125. Melville B. Nimmer has labeled this "definitional" balancing. Melville B.
Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied
to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 Cal. L. Rev. 935, 942 (1968); see Ducat, supra
note 123, at 129 n.28; Heyman, supra note 41, at 1357. But see Aleinikoff, supra note
33, at 979-81 (arguing that while "definitional" balancing promises more certainty
than "ad hoc" balancing, the distinction between the two approaches often proves to
be artificial in reality). The obvious-and frequently voiced-criticism of balancing is
that courts lack objective criteria for weighing or comparing competing interests.
Without such criteria, subjectivity threatens to tip the scales. See Ducat, supra note
123, at 127-28; Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 972-76, 992-94. In response to objections
that a rights-based approach may undermine the protection of free speech, Heyman
argues that the approach actually strengthens the normative basis of free speech in
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The next part discusses the difficulties in analyzing implicit threats
as illustrated through Planned Parenthood v. ACLA. The Supreme
Court's formulation of the incitement to unlawful action and true
threats doctrines and the level of First Amendment protection
currently associated with each doctrine provide a backdrop to the
complex issues posed by Planned Parenthood. Part II begins with an
overview of these doctrines and then presents the facts and issues
involved in Planned Parenthood, focusing on the role the doctrines
played in the case's progression through the Ninth Circuit.
II. INCITEMENT OF UNLAWFUL ACTION, TRUE THREATS AND
PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. ACLA

Planned Parenthood v. ACLA, 126 branded "one of the most
controversial [cases] in the U.S. struggle over abortion,"'2 7 surpassed
the confines of the abortion debate and ultimately emerged as a case
The case epitomizes the
of First Amendment jurisprudence. 12'
complexities involved in analyzing implicit threats embedded in what
the speaker claims to be political speech. Whether the materials
published by the ACLA are properly categorized as threats made to
doctors by zealous pro-life advocates, or as incitement-as the
violence allegedly threatened is by unknown third parties inspired to
act from the messages relayed in the posters and website-remained a
hotly contested29 issue throughout the case's progression through the
Ninth Circuit.

One of the reasons the case spawned so much controversy is that on
their face, the ACLA's expressions clearly appear to comport with the
two ways: (1) "free speech may enjoy the strongest status as a right when it must be
exercised with due regard for the rights of others"; and (2) "free speech furthers the
individual and social good most effectively when it is required to respect the rights of
others." Heyman, supra note 41, at 1368-69; see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 24347 (1999). Another common objection to balancing is that it allows the judiciary to
assume the role of the legislature. See Ducat, supra note 123, at 130-36; Aleinikoff,
supra note 33, at 984-86, 991-92.
126. 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., Kozinski, J., Berzon, J.,
dissenting), reh'g en banc denied, No. 99-35320, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 13829 (July 10,
2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 2637, 2638 (2003).
127. Andrew Quinn, Anti-abortion 'Terror' Tactics Ruled Illegal, Nat'l Post, May
17, 2002, at A13.
128. See Berlin, supra note 3, at 26 (stating "this case illustrates how the intense
public controversy over legalized abortion continues to test the limits of First
Amendment jurisprudence and to press the boundaries of permissible forms of
expression"); Tony Mauro, Justices to Consider Hearing Anti-Abortion Free Speech
Case, Fulton County Daily Rep., Dec. 9, 2002, at 1 (quoting defense counsel Edward
White III of the Thomas More Law Center as stating "[t]his case concerns free speech
in America"); Volokh, supra note 3 (recognizing that "there's much more at stake
here than this one particular movement"). The case's potential to redefine existing
First Amendment jurisprudence ended with the Supreme Court's decision to deny
certiorari in 2003. ACLA v. Planned Parenthood, 123 S.Ct. 2637, 2638 (2003).
129. See Berlin, supra note 3, at 28.
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First Amendment. The sharp division among the Ninth Circuit judges
and the fervent reactions in the wake of each decision exhibit how
implicit threats may compromise a court's ability to discern with
which type of speech it is dealing. The initial characterization of the
ACLA's materials proved to play a decisive role in the outcome of the
case. 130
The difficult issues presented by Planned Parenthood
highlight the shortcomings of the true threats doctrine, particularly
when the alleged threats are implicit and coupled with a political
message.
This part discusses Planned Parenthood v. A CLA and the two
categories of speech involved in its adjudication: incitement or
advocacy of unlawful action and true threats. Part II.A. outlines the
Supreme Court's formulation of the incitement of unlawful action and
the true threats doctrines and the contrasting level of First
Amendment protection currently associated with each doctrine. Part
II.B. provides an overview of the facts and issues presented by
Planned Parenthood. Part II.C. traces the controversial case's
progression through the Ninth Circuit.
A. Incitement of Unlawful Action and True Threats
While the First Amendment has been broadly interpreted to
encompass a wide array of language and expression, the right is not
absolute.'
As stated by Professors Malloy and Krotoszynski: "The
First Amendment does not guarantee an absolute right to anyone, to
express their views any place, at any time, and in any way they
want."' 3 2 Certain categories of speech-fighting words,13 3 obscenity,'
defamation,'35 commercial speech, 3 6 speech likely to incite imminent
lawless action, 3 7 and speech categorized as "true threats"' 38-have
been identified as posing a potential risk to society.'3 9 The Supreme
Court has held that proscribing these categories of speech-which
arguably do not promote the values underlying the First

130. See infra Part II.C.
131. See Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Free Speech and the Right to Offend:
Old Wars, New Battles, Different Media, 18 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 671, 675 (2002); Malloy
& Krotoszynski, supra note 30, at 1178-79; Ashley Packard, Threats or Theater: Does
Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists Signify That Tests for
"True Threats" Need to Change?,5 Comm. L. & Pol'y 235, 246 (2000).
132. Malloy & Krotoszynski, supra note 30, at 1178-79 (quoting Olivieri v. Ward,
801 F.2d 602, 605 (2d Cir. 1986)).
133. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
134. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
135. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
136. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
137. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
138. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
139. See Malloy & Krotoszynski, supra note 30, at 1183; Calvert & Richards, supra
note 131, at 675-76.
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Amendment14 0 -on the basis of content
is constitutional so long as the
141

regulations remain viewpoint-neutral.

1. Incitement of Unlawful Action
The modern incitement doctrine, formulated by the Supreme

Court's per curiam opinion in Brandenburg v. Ohio,42 evolved from
the clear and present danger test articulated by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes in Schenck v. United States143 and invoked in a line of cases

arising under the Espionage Act.'" The clear and present danger test
hinged upon a determination of "whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent.' ' 4 As Justice Holmes explained: "It
is a question of proximity and degree.' 1 46 The limited First
Amendment protection offered under the clear and present danger
test is magnified by the Espionage Act cases,'4 7 where the Supreme
Court upheld several convictions of members of the Socialist and

Communist parties for their efforts to encourage
48 drafted men to resist
the call to military service during times of war.
140. See Malloy & Krotoszynski, supra note 30, at 1183.
141. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382-84 (1992). Regulations
that are viewpoint-neutral are based on the category of speech, rather than the
particular viewpoint being expressed. Id. at 383-84. While the Constitution does not
require that all categories of speech receive the same level of First Amendment
protection, it does require that equal protection be afforded to all speech within a
given category. Id. For example, regulations that only proscribe libel that criticizes
the government would not be viewpoint-neutral. Id. at 384. In order to remain within
its constitutional bounds, the government may only proscribe libel as a category,
regardless of the view conveyed by a particular message. Id.; see Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) (explaining that "[a]s a general rule, laws that by
their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the
ideas or views expressed are content based"); C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty &
Freedom of Speech 125 (1989) ("The constitutionality of regulating the time, place,
and manner of assemblies and regulating the physical components of expressive
conduct depends on the 'reasonableness' of a particular restriction."); Calvert &
Richards, supra note 131, at 676 (noting that as a "general rule.., speech may not be
censored solely because some find it offensive").
142. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
143. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
144. See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 205 (1919); Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211, 212 (1919).
145. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
146. Id.
147. See supra note 144.
148. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951) (upholding the
conviction of eleven members of the Communist party for distribution of pamphlets
and organization of classes to teach communist principles during World War II as
violating the Smith Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 671 (1940) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
2385 (1994))); Debs, 249 U.S. 211 (finding a speech delivered by Debs as violating the
Espionage Act for inciting insubordination, disloyalty and refusal to serve among
those called to serve in U.S. military forces during World War I); Frohwerk, 249 U.S.
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The Brandenburg test shifted away from the clear and present
danger test's focus on gravity and probability to encompass the quality
and context of the challenged speech. 149
Additionally, the
Brandenburg Court abandoned the significance that the clear and
present danger test attributed to a "dangerous environment." 5 ' This
resulted in a substantial increase of protection given to speech
advocating unlawful action."'
Brandenburg was a Ku Klux Klan leader convicted under the Ohio
Criminal Syndicalism statute for activities and hate speech targeting
African-Americans and Jews that occurred at a Klan rally. 5 2 The
Supreme Court reversed the Ohio Supreme Court's conviction,
holding that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use
of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action."'5 3
The Court stressed the fundamental
difference between abstractly teaching a need to resort to violence
and preparing and leading
a group to take violent action in
54
formulating its new test.
The language invoked in the opinion stressed that the distinction
between mere advocacy and incitement to imminent lawless action
was an imperative element to safeguarding the right to speech as
guaranteed by the First Amendment. 55 In failing to make this
at 204 (upholding Frohwerk's indictment under the Espionage Act for mailing
circulars to men who had been called and accepted for military service during World
War I); Schenck, 249 U.S. at 47 (same).
149. See Kobil, supra note 18, at 237-38; Packard, supra note 131, at 248.
150. Whether the circumstances and audience of the speaker amounted to a
"dangerous environment" was considered in the application of the clear and present
danger test. See David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech,
Communicative Torts, and the Borderlandof the Brandenburg Test, 29 Ga. L. Rev. 1,
4, 13 (1994). Delivering a hate speech in front of an angry, racially charged mob
would be considered a "dangerous environment," as the circumstances and
composition of the audience increased the likelihood that the speaker's message
would be carried out. Id. In contrast, delivering the same speech in a quiet and
peaceful park would not be considered a "dangerous environment," as there would be
little likelihood that the speaker's words would be acted upon. See id.; Packard, supra
note 131, at 248.
151. This evolution of the clear and present danger test consisted of a collaboration
of Holmes and Brandeis, which "began in 1919 and culminated in Brandeis's Whitney
opinion in 1927." Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 190; see Crump, supra note 150, at 12;
Vitiello, supra note 30, at 1218-19 (predicting that if the cases arising under the
Espionage Act (Dennis and its analogous contemporaries) were reheard today, "the
results would almost certainly be different").
152. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444-47 (1969). The events of the rally were
filmed and subsequently aired by a television reporter in attendance as a result of an
invitation extended by Brandenburg. Id. at 445-46.
153. Id. at 447.
154. Id. at 447-48 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).
155. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448-49. While the Court maintained that it upheld
the constitutionality of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385, based on this theory in

1308

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

distinction, the Court branded the Ohio statute as an unconstitutional
intrusion on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 5 6
Following the Brandenburg decision, the Court has only examined

the elements of the incitement test on two other occasions.157 The
first, Hess v. Indiana,'58 arose out of an antiwar demonstration at the
University of Indiana.'59 A group of 100 to 150 demonstrators had
filtered into the streets, blocking traffic. 160 As the police were
attempting to clear the street, Hess was overheard saying "'[w]e'll

take the fucking street later' or "'[w]e'll take the fucking street
again.'''161 The Supreme Court's per curiam opinion overturned Hess'

conviction for violating Indiana's disorderly conduct statute. 6 2 The

Court reasoned that the statement "at worst ...amounted to nothing
more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time,' 6 3
Dennis, Professor Rohr has pointed out the inconsistencies in this assertion:
The Court had... articulated a verbal formula that appeared more
protective of seditious advocacy than any statement ever before made in a
Supreme Court majority opinion, yet it was simultaneously suggesting that
(a) this was nothing new, and (b) it was fully consistent with a decision
(Dennis) that had upheld the conviction of advocates of revolution without
any concern for the "imminence" or "likelihood" of that revolution. Either
the author of the opinion was being quite disingenuous, or the apparently
highly-protective new test was not meant to provide as much protection as
its words suggested.
Marc Rohr, Grand Illusion? The Brandenburg Test and Speech That Encouragesor
Facilitates Criminal Acts, 38 Willamette L. Rev. 1, 7-8 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
According to Rohr, the rest of the opinion supports the latter alternative. Id. at 8; see
also Redish, supra note 17, at 184 ("The Court mysteriously cited Dennis to support
its understanding of proper analysis, but the difference in the two decisions'
treatments of the imminence requirement rendered it doubtful that Brandenburg
followed the Dennis rationale.").
156. Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 449. Because the Court overturned Brandenburg's
conviction on the basis that the Ohio statute was unconstitutional, it never stated
whether the speech in question satisfied the imminence requirement it had
articulated. See Vitiello, supra note 30, at 1232-33.
157. See Vitiello, supra note 30, at 1214; Rohr, supra note 155, at 10, 12.
158. 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam). Rohr designates Hess as "[t]he only
Supreme Court decision that sheds any clear light on the meaning of the Brandenburg
test." Rohr, supra note 155, at 10.
159. Hess, 414 U.S. at 106-07.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 107.
162. Id. at 109. Before overturning the conviction, the Court concluded that the
words uttered by Hess could not be classified as belonging to the limited categories
beyond the scope of First Amendment protection. Id. at 107-09. The Court noted that
the statement was not directed toward any group or person in particular and did not
amount to fighting words as defined by Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942) (defining "fighting words" as words whose "very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace").
163. Hess, 414 U.S. at 108. One can reasonably assume that the action Hess was
advocating was intended to occur at some point later in the day. Even though "later"
would occur relatively soon (within a few hours), it did not sufficiently satisfy
Brandenburg's imminence requirement. See Crump, supra note 150, at 18;
Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 209; Rohr, supra note 155, at 12. Greenawalt contends
that while the imminence requirement is not completely devoid of flexibility, Hess
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and thus failed to meet the imminence requirement set forth in
Brandenburg.
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.'M presented the Court with its
second opportunity to invoke-and possibly refine-the Brandenburg
test. In March 1966, the black citizens of Claiborne County,
Mississippi, imposed a boycott on white merchants of the county after
the county's white elected officials failed to adequately respond to a
list of particularized demands
submitted in hopes of realizing racial
65
equality and integration.1
On October 31, 1969, a number of the white merchants brought suit
to recover losses incurred as a result of the boycott and to enjoin
future boycott activity. 66 The merchants also sought to impose
personal liability on Charles Evers, the NAACP's Field Secretary,
claiming that he had perpetuated the boycott by threatening violence
against members of the black community who had failed to
participate.1 67
Evers voiced his alleged threats during NAACP meetings. On
April 1, 1966, he was reported to have announced that blacks not
participating in the boycott would be "answerable to him" and "would
have their necks broken.' 16 s On April 19, 1966, violators were again
warned that they would be "disciplined" and reminded that the sheriff
"could not sleep with [them] at night.' 1 69 In a third speech on April
21, Evers cautioned: "If we catch any of you going in any of them
racist stores, we're gonna break your damn neck."' 70 It was the
contention of the white merchants that Evers' violent threats had
furthered the boycott and he should therefore be held personally
liable for their economic losses.'71
In considering Evers's liability, the Court observed that the First
"represents an explicit reaffirmation of the Brandenburg standard and an
interpretation of imminence that is very restrictive." Greenawalt, supra note 26, at
209; see Gey, supra note 18, at 547 (maintaining that the "highly protective nature of
the Brandenburgstandard was driven home" by Hess).
164. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
165. Id. at 889.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 898. During the course of the boycott, "Black Hats" or "Deacons"
would monitor the storefronts of white merchants and report the names of violators.
These names were subsequently read aloud at NAACP meetings and published in the
"Black Times." Id. at 903-04.
168. Id. at 900 n.28 (internal quotations and emphasis omitted).
169. Id. at 902.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 907-08. The merchants' claim for damages was based on three separate
conspiracy theories-malicious interference with their business; violation of a state
statute prohibiting secondary boycotts, on the theory that the defendants primary
dispute was with the County's governing authorities and not the white merchants; and
violation of the state antitrust statute, on the theory that the boycott had shifted black
patronage to black merchants, thereby creating an unreasonable limitation on
competition that once existed between black and white merchants. Id. at 890-91.
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Amendment prohibited imposing liability on an individual based
solely on his association with another. 172 For Evers to be held liable
for belonging to a group comprised of some violent members, it would
be necessary for the merchants to establish that the group possessed
unlawful goals and that Evers had a specific intent to further those
goals.17 3 The Court identified three theories which would justify
holding Evers liable for the unlawful acts of others:
(1) he
"authorized, directed or ratified" specific unlawful activity; (2) his
public speeches were likely to incite unlawful actions and those
actions occurred within a reasonable period of time; and (3) the
speeches provided evidence that he had given other specific
instructions to carry out threats or acts of violence.174
The lower court had concluded that despite the five incidents of
violence occurring in 1966 and the five incidents of violence for which
dates were not supplied, the boycott was generally executed in a
"peaceful and orderly" manner. 175 The Court agreed with this
conclusion, noting that the record demonstrated that most of the black
1 76
community went along with the boycott on their own volition.
Accordingly, Evers's "emotionally charged rhetoric"'77 did not fall
outside the scope of First Amendment protection as set forth in
Brandenburg: 178

172. Id. at 918-19.
173. Id. at 920.
174. Id. at 927. Redish has stated that it would be unacceptable to render a
statement unprotected merely on the basis that it may properly be characterized as
"unlawful advocacy": "If the first amendment means anything, it represents a value
judgment that the interchange of ideas, information and suggestions is to be kept free
and open, at least if the interchange presents no real threat of harm to society."
Redish, supra note 17, at 85. Vitiello has highlighted that with regards to the Court's
second possible basis for liability, the First Amendment does require harm to actually
have occurred before civil liability can be imposed-"[i]t is enough that the harm be
imminent." Vitiello, supra note 30, at 1235-36.
175. Claiborne Hardware,458 U.S. at 903-05. This assessment of the boycott was
made despite the documentation of several acts of violence, including shots being
fired into homes, people being beaten, and tires slashed. See Berlin, supra note 3, at
30; Volokh, supra note 3.
176. ClaiborneHardware,458 U.S. at 922.
177. Id. at 928.
178. As the evidence failed to support a finding that either Evers or the NAACP
had authorized, directed or ratified unlawful conduct (apart from Evers's speeches in
question), both Evers's speech and the NAACP's rights to political association
warranted First Amendment protection. Id. at 931. According to Gey, it is not the
nature of the boycott that distinguishes it from other movements and disputes, but the
fact that the Court found Evers's speeches to be worthy of First Amendment
protection:
despite the fact that Mr. Evers used explicitly threatening language, despite
the fact that this language was used in the charged atmosphere of a small
town where several acts of violence had already occurred, and despite the
fact that those identified and threatened by Mr. Evers in his speeches had
good cause to take the threats seriously.
Gey, supra note 18, at 551.
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An advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with
spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity and action in a
common cause. When such appeals do not incite lawless action,
they must be regarded as protected speech. To rule otherwise would
ignore the "profound national commitment" that "debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' 79

Justice Stevens noted, however, that had acts of violence followed
Evers's speeches within a reasonable time,80"a substantial question" as
to his liability would have been presented.
The Brandenburg test remains the predominant test for courts to
determine whether advocacy or incitement of unlawful action is
According to
worthy of First Amendment protection.1 8'
Brandenburg's standards, two conditions must be met for incitement
to be deemed unworthy of First Amendment protection: (1) it "is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action," and (2) "is
likely to incite or produce such action.' 18 2 The two conditions have
been understood to weave both objective and subjective elements into
the standard. 8 3 The first condition relates to a subjective intent on the
part of the speaker, and the second condition ties in an objective
element.
The pivotal Brandenburg decision was handed down in the wake of
Watts v. United States,'" which remains the leading case governing
true threats jurisprudence. Similar to advocacy or incitement of
unlawful action, threats are not viewed as promoting the values
179. Claiborne Hardware,458 U.S. at 928 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964)); see Volokh, supra note 3 (stating that deciding whether or not
to protect Evers's speech was "a genuinely difficult issue," but that the Court "got it
basically right, because the alternative is so restrictive").
180. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 928. In his application of Brandenburg,
Justice Stevens replaced the term "imminence" with the phrase "reasonable period."
181. See Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 207; Gey, supra note 18, at 547; O'Neil,
supra note 44, at 12.
182. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); see Greenawalt, supra note 26,
at 207; Crump, supra note 150, at 4. Other scholars have broken down these
conditions into more than two parts. See, e.g., Gey, supra note 18, at 547 (breaking
the Brandenburgtest down into three conditions); Andrew B. Sims, Tort Liability for
Physical Injuries Allegedly Resulting from Media Speech: A Comprehensive First
Amendment Approach, 34 Ariz. L. Rev. 231, 256 (1992) (interpreting the test as
consisting of four elements). Kobil notes that under Brandenburg,a speaker has two
possible ways to avoid liability: (1) to advocate for unlawful action at some future
point, which functions as a "safe harbor" by evading the immanency requirement, (as
seen in Hess), or (2) to advocate for unlawful action that is "objectively 'unlikely"' to
occur due to surrounding circumstances (as demonstrated by Claiborne Hardware).
Kobil, supra note 18, at 233.
183. Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 207; see also Gey, supra note 18, at 547
(identifying the speaker's subjective intent as comprising a necessary element of the
Brandenburgtest); Sims, supra note 182, at 256 (same). But see Rohr, supra note 155,
at 15 (questioning whether Brandenburgrequires that the speaker harbor a subjective
intent to incite unlawful action or merely that the words explicitly compel the
commission of the unlawful act, regardless of the subjective intent of the speaker).
184. 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam).
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underlying the First Amendment. Accordingly, the Court determined
that proscribing the category of threats did not infringe upon a
speaker's First Amendment rights.
2. True Threats

Another variety of speech, comprising a separate, yet related
category to incitement, is true threats.
The Supreme Court

established the "true threats" doctrine in Watts v. United States.185

Watts, an eighteen year-old male, was convicted by a D.C. District
Court jury for violating a statute prohibiting any person from
"knowingly and willfully... [making] any threat to take the life of or
to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States" during
a 1966 rally at the Washington Monument.

s6

In opposition to his

draft classification, Watts stated that "[i]f they ever make me carry a
rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.' 18 7 The comment
was met with laughter from his surrounding audience.188
In holding that "true threats" are not entitled to First Amendment

protection, the Court proclaimed: "[A] threat must be distinguished

from what is constitutionally protected speech." 18 9 Despite finding the

statute constitutional on its face, the Court did not find that Watts's
"political hyperbole" constituted the statutory term "true threat." 190
Reciting our nation's commitment to "uninhibited, robust, and wideopen" political debate, the Court recognized that this often entails
"vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials."'9 1 In light of the context in which
the statement was made-the conditional nature and the audience's
185. Id. It is interesting to note that Watts does not contain language or reasoning
resembling Brandenburg,even though Watts was decided only two months prior. See
Robert Kurman Kelner, Note, United States v. Jake Baker: Revisiting Threats and the
FirstAmendment, 84 Va. L. Rev. 287, 293 (1998); Rohr, supra note 155, at 22.
186. Watts, 394 U.S. at 705-06 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 871(a)).
187. Id. at 706.
188. Id. at 707.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 708. The Court recognized the division in interpreting statute's
willfulness requirement among the Court of Appeals judges. Id. (citing Watts v.
United States, 402 F.2d 676, 686-93 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., dissenting)). The
Court expressed "grave doubts" as to the majority's conclusion that the willfulness
requirement was satisfied "if the speaker voluntarily uttered the charged words with
'an apparent determination to carry them into execution."' Watts, 394 U.S. at 707
(quoting Ragansky v. United States, 253 F. 643, 645 (7th Cir. 1918). While the Court
did not resolve the dispute, it appeared to be aligned with Judge J. Skelly Wright's
contention that a showing of specific intent to carry out the threat was necessary so as
not to infringe on protected speech. See Watts, 402 F.2d at 691 (Skelly, J., dissenting).
Packard maintains that in adopting an objective standard, the lower courts have, in
effect, "ignored the Supreme Court's dicta" and "side-step[ped]" the difficulty in
determining a speaker's state-of-mind. Packard, supra note 131, at 258.
191. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S 254, 270
(1964)).
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reaction-the Court labeled Watts's expression as amounting to
nothing more than "a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a
political opposition to the President.' 19 2 As Watts's comment did not

amount to a "true threat," his expression was within his First
Amendment right to free speech.
The Court later shared its rationale for holding threats unworthy of
193
First Amendment protection in RA.V v. City of St. Paul.
The
petitioner was charged with violating the St. Paul Bias Motivated
Crime Ordinance19 4 for constructing and burning a cross inside a
fenced yard of a black family.195 Despite declaring the ordinance

facially unconstitutional for prohibiting otherwise permitted speech

based only on the subjects being addressed,19 6 the Court set forth its

reasons for casting true threats beyond the scope of First Amendment
protection: to "protect[] individuals from the fear of violence, from
the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the
threatened violence will occur."' 97 Hence, the true threats doctrine

was designed not only to protect potential victims from actual

violence, but from the reasonable apprehension of fear as well.' 9 If
the target of the threat takes steps to protect himself or is in some way
disrupted from his normal course of activities, the deliverer of the

192. Id. The Court further noted that "[t]he language of the political arena, like
the language used in labor disputes, is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact" to
support its holding. Id. (citation omitted); see Gey, supra note 18, at 548 (noting that
no one in Watts's audience would "seriously believe that he intended the threatening
statements to be taken literally," nor would the statement have prompted anyone at
the White House to take protective measures).
193. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
194. Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02
(1990). The ordinance provides:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or
Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Id. (cited in R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380).
195. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 379-80.
196. Id. at 381.
197. Id. at 388. Models proposed by Greenawalt and Baker offer frameworks for
identifying threats beyond the reach of the First Amendment. Greenawalt's model
generally classifies "manipulative threats," which entail an intermediate situationaltering circumstance (as opposed to warning threats which entail a "natural
response") as unprotected threats. Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 90-104. Baker's
model, premised on the liberty theory, allows individuals to use speech in pursuit or
furtherance of their substantive values so long as it is not accomplished in "a coercive
manner or by invasions of other people's realm of decision-making authority." Baker,
supra note 141, at 60-62.
198. See Berlin, supra note 3, at 28-29; Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 290; Kelner,
supra note 185, at 291.
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threat can be punished regardless of whether or not he had the actual
intention or capacity to execute the threat. 99
While Watts established that true threats were unworthy of First
Amendment protection, the Court declined to define "true threat" or
propose guidelines to assist lower courts in evaluating allegedly
threatening speech. 20 The Court only suggested that a statement
should be considered in context, taking into account its conditional
nature and the reaction of listeners, when evaluated.0 In light of the
limited guidance provided by the Court, lower courts have been left
largely to their own devices to develop true threats jurisprudence. °
As a result, the standard by which threats are judged and the
level of
203
protection they are afforded varies throughout the country.
One trend that has emerged among the lower courts is the focus on
the general, rather than specific, intent of the speaker.2 ' This is
accomplished through either a reasonable speaker or reasonable
listener test.20 5 Interpreting threats using an objective standard, as
opposed to a subjective standard based on the speaker's intent, is the
common element, which exists regardless of whether it is the speaker
or listener providing the perspective upon which the analysis will be
based.20 6 Employing an objective standard shifts the focus of the
court's analysis from the speaker's intent to how the threat was
perceived.0 7
199. See Berlin, supra note 3, at 28.
200. See Packard, supra note 131, at 246; Kelner, supra note 185, at 297-98; Gey,
supra note 18, at 545, 582 (noting that the discussion of threats in both Supreme Court
jurisprudence and academic literature on the First Amendment is limited).
201. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969); Packard, supra note 131, at
246.
202. See Kelner, supra note 185, at 303 (documenting that the Supreme Court has
denied certiorari in a number of cases that presented an opportunity to clarify its true
threats doctrine).
203. See Gey, supra note 18, at 545; O'Neil, supra note 44, at 63; infra Parts
II.A.2.a.-b.
204. See Packard, supra note 131, at 251; Kelner, supra note 185, at 296-97.
205. For example, the First and Ninth Circuits have adopted a reasonable speaker
test, while the Second, Fourth and Seventh Circuits have opted for a listener-based
test. See Packard, supra note 131, at 254-55; infra Parts II.A.2.a.-b.
206. As the Ninth Circuit observed in Planned Parenthood,all circuits take content
into account, and whether the expression is approached from the reasonable speaker
or listener point of view does not appear to produce different outcomes. Planned
Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. ACLA, 290 F.3d 1058, 1076 (9th Cir.
2002). As the majority noted: "We, and so far as we can tell, other circuits as well,
consider the whole factual context and 'all of the circumstances,' in order to
determine whether a statement is a true threat." Id. at 1078 (citation omitted); see
Packard, supra note 131, at 257.
207. See supra note 190; Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 46-48 (1975)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (warning that an "objective interpretation embodies a
negligence standard, charging the defendant with responsibility for the effect of his
statements on his listeners" and proposing a requirement of "proof that the speaker
intended his statement to be taken as a threat, even if he had no intention of actually
carrying it out"); Packard, supra note 131, at 256; O'Neil, supra note 44, at 63 (noting
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Consideration of the standards used in the Second and Ninth
Circuits provides valuable insight into the various approaches courts
take, as the Second Circuit has adopted a listener-based test and the
Ninth Circuit a speaker-based test. It is also noteworthy that the
Second Circuit's standard has been modified to a more lenient
standard than was initially required. Additionally, both Circuits' tests
were invoked in Planned Parenthoodv. ACLA and will be revisited in
Part II.C.
a. The Second Circuit: A Listener-Based Test
Commentators regard the standard set forth by the Second Circuit
in United States v. Kelner2 08 as the most speech-protective test created
by the lower courts. 9 Russell Kelner, a member of the Jewish
Defense League ("JDL"), was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2,
875(c) 21 1 for threatening to assassinate Yasser Arafat, leader of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization ("PLO"). 2 11
At a JDL

conference, held in response to Arafat's scheduled appearance at a
United Nations General Assembly meeting, Kelner-dressed in
military fatigues with a gun on the desk in front of him-confirmed
the existence of a plan to assassinate Arafat.2 12
that "lower courts have made clear that there must be substantial and reasonable
apprehension on the part of the person claiming to have been threatened before a
legal claim, civil or criminal, can be recognized"). It has been purported that under
this standard, Greenpeace could potentially be held liable for reporting the names of
polluters or newspapers for publishing the names of Nazis living in the United States,
as such disclosures would foreseeably cause those named to fear retaliation. See
Robyn E. Blumner, Anti-Abortion Site Doesn't Cross the Line, St. Petersburg Times,
Feb. 7, 1999, at 6D; Nat Hentoff, When 'Pro-Lifers' Threaten Lives, Wash. Post, Feb.
27, 1999, at A21.
208. 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976).
209. See Gey, supra note 18, at 572 (explaining that despite offering more
protection than other lower court standards, the Kelner standard still fell short of the
protection ensured by the Brandenburg standard); Kelner, supra note 185, at 294-95;
Packard, supra note 131, at 260.
210. 18 U.S.C. § 2 provides:
Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal.
Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by
him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable
as a principal.
18 U.S.C. § 2 (a)-(b) (2000). 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) provides:
Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any
communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any
threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 875(c).
211. Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1020-21 (describing Kelner's speaking of a detailed plan to
assassinate Arafat).
212. Id. at 1021. The confirmation was made during an interview with reporter
John Miller and aired on the evening news. Id.
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In recognition of the First Amendment concerns advanced by the
Supreme Court in Watts, the Second Circuit held that an expression
may be considered a true threat "[s]o long as the threat on its face and
in the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as
to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of
execution. ' 213 The court reasoned that a narrow construction of
"threat" was intended by Watts and necessary to ensure the
preservation of First Amendment rights.1 4 The court further held
that it did not require proof that Kelner harbored a specific intent to
actually execute the crime, as "it is the utterance which the statute
2 15
makes criminal, not the specific intent to carry out the threat.
Concluding that the language and nature of Kelner's statement was an
unequivocal, unconditional and immediate threat upon the life or
safety of Arafat and his aides, the court affirmed his conviction.2 16
The Second Circuit's holding in United States v. Malik,2 7 however,
marked a retreat from the protective test derived from Kelner's
narrow construction of the term "threat." Malik was charged for
mailing threatening communications, in which he threatened the
adversaries in his lawsuit and their families and a United States
federal judge, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 876, 115 (a)(1)(B).2 18
The first threat was expressed in a letter received by the Honorable
Thomas P. Griesa, United States District Judge for the Southern
District of New York, on December 26, 1989, in which Malik stated
that he would interpret the court's intentional delay of handling his
cases as telling him to "deal with each of these defendants [sic] family
and them physically upon his soon prison discharge. 21 9 The second
threat, contained in a letter dated September 3, 1990, and filed in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on September
27, 1990, referred to the "Jewish Judges [sic] action of unfairness" in
taking the defendant's twenty thousand dollars.220 Judge Mahoney
221
interpreted the letter as a threat to the members of the panel.
213. Id. at 1027.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1025. Gey attributes this aspect of the decision as damaging the
potentially protective standard: "The Second Circuit's assumption that proof of
specific intent is not required in a true threat case misreads Watts and is inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's strong protection of threatening language in both
Brandenburg and Claiborne Hardware." Gey, supra note 18, at 573; see supra note
190.
216. Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1027-28. The court based its conclusion on the fact that
Kelner's message was specific, immediate and reinforced by military fatigues and the
presence of a gun. Id. at 1028.
217. 16 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 1994).
218. 18 U.S.C. § 876 (2002); 18 U.S.C. § 115; Malik, 16 F.3d at 47-48.
219. Malik, 16 F.3d at 48.
220. Id. at 48-49.
221. Id. at 49.
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The Second Circuit announced that the absence of explicitly
threatening language does not necessarily preclude the finding of a
threat.222 In evaluating Malik's arguably ambiguous threats, the court
adhered to a reasonable listener test, which allowed for contextual
evidence to clarify whether ambiguous language constituted a true
threat.223 While the court noted that the charge to the jury-in which
the jury was instructed to consider whether the language of Malik's
statements and the circumstances in which they were made "were so
[unequivocal], unconditional and specific as to convey to the recipient
'
a gravity of purpose and apparent prospect of execution 224_
225
embodied the language of Kelner, Malik in effect reduced the
rigorousness of the Kelner standard by allowing contextual evidence
to clarify ambiguous language. 226 Through Malik's acceptance of
contextual evidence, the Second Circuit expanded upon Kelner's
narrow construction of a true threat and moved closer toward the
objective standard employed by the Ninth Circuit's speaker-based test
for analyzing threats as discussed below.
b. The Ninth Circuit: A Speaker-Based Test
The Ninth Circuit articulated its standard for determining a true
threat in United States v. Orozco-Santillan.227 Orozco-Santillan, a
deportable alien, was convicted on three counts of threatening to
assault a federal enforcement officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115.228
His conviction was based on statements made to Immigration
Naturalization Service ("INS") Agent Vela on three separate
22 Counts I and II arose from phone
occasions. 221
calls made to Vela in
which Orozco-Santillan made threatening comments relating to his
arrest, including "you motherfucker... you will pay for this" and

222. Id.
223. Id. at 49-51. "The test is an objective one-namely, whether 'an ordinary,
reasonable recipient who is familiar with the context of the letter would interpret it as
a threat of injury."' Id. at 49 (quoting United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356, 1358
(4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 933 (1974)).
224. Malik, 16 F.3d at 51.
225. Id.
226. See Gey, supra note 18, at 575-76.
227. 903 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1990).
228. Id. at 1264. 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) provides:
Whoever threatens to assault, kidnap, or murder, a United States official, a
United States judge, a Federal law enforcement officer, or an official whose
killing would be a crime under such section, with intent to impede,
intimidate, or interfere with such official, judge, or law enforcement officer
while engaged in the performance of official duties, or with intent to
retaliate against such official, judge, or law enforcement officer on account
of the performance of official duties, shall be punished as provided in
subsection (b).
18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) (2002).
229. Orozco-Santillan,903 F.2d at 1264.
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Count III materialized during

Orozco-Santillan's arrest, at which time he told Vela to "take these
handcuffs off and I'll kick your fucking ass" and "pinche emigra,"
("fucking immigration") as he pushed Vela with his elbow.231
The court defined a threat as "'an expression of an intention to
inflict evil, injury, or damage on another, ' '

232

which "should be

considered in light of [its] entire factual context, including the
surrounding events and reaction of the listeners. 2 3 3

The court

announced that whether a statement constituted a "true threat" would
be determined by an objective speaker-based standard: "[W]here a
reasonable person would foresee that the listener will believe he will

be subjected to physical violence upon his person, [the expression] is
unprotected by the first amendment., 234 Finding sufficient evidence
that a reasonable listener would interpret Orozco-Santillan's
statements as threats, the court upheld his conviction.235
The Ninth Circuit confirmed this standard in Lovell v. Poway
Unified School District.36 Lovell, a fifteen year-old tenth grader,
allegedly threatened to shoot guidance counselor Linda Suokko if she
did not receive her requested schedule change.2 37 In its review, the
Ninth Circuit invoked the objective standard and contextual analysis
as set forth in Orozco-Santillan. In light of the "unequivocal and
specific" nature of the statement and the "increasing violence among
school children today,, 231 the court concluded that a reasonable
person would have foreseen that Suokko would construe the
statement as a threat.239
230. Id. (translated by Agent Vela).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1265 (quoting United States v. Gilbert, 884 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir.
1989)).
233. Id. (citation omitted). The court stressed that "'[t]he fact that a threat is
subtle does not make it less of a threat."' Id. (quoting Gilbert, 884 F.2d at 457).
234. Id. at 1265-66. In response to implementation of this standard, some First
Amendment scholars argue that it "is not as rigorous in protection of First
Amendment rights as intended by the Supreme Court." Packard, supra note 131, at
245-46.
235. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1266.
236. 90 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1996).
237. Id. at 369. Testimony regarding the alleged threat varied. Suokko claimed
that Lovell threatened: "If you don't give me this schedule change, I'm going to shoot
you!" while Lovell claims to have stated: "I'm so angry, I could just shoot someone."
238. Id. at 372 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 619 (1995) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting), for sources supporting the proposition that guns and violence is a
widespread and serious problem in high schools). According to Kelner, the Ninth
Circuit's use of the Second Circuit's language from United States v. Kelner was
misplaced, as it treated the decision's definition of a true threat ("unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate, and specific") "as if it were in accord with the 'reasonable
person' test."
Kelner, supra note 185, at 299-300; see supra note 213 and
accompanying text.
239. Lovell, 90 F.3d at 372. This conclusion resulted in a reversal of the district
court's judgment. Critics of the court's standard have argued that in focusing on the
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True threats jurisprudence is driven by an objective standard,
regardless of whether the focus is placed on the speaker or the
listener. The lower courts generally fail to incorporate the subjective
intent of the speaker when analyzing alleged threats. Commentators
have criticized this failure and view it as diminishing the level of First
Amendment protection intended by the Watts precedent. The
divergent levels of First Amendment protection currently afforded by
the incitement and true threats doctrines reinforce these criticisms of
the true threats doctrine.
3. Contrast Between Current Threats and Incitement Doctrines
While the categories of speech at issue in the Brandenburg and
Watts opinions are similar, the precedents have received divergent
treatment. Commentators have acclaimed the Brandenburg test as a
vast improvement over its predecessor, the clear and present danger
test.2 40 As Professor Kobil articulated: "One of Brandenburg'svirtues
is that in most cases its rigor forces the state to focus on preventing 2or41
punishing unlawful action rather than prosecuting speech.
level of First Amendment
Commentators have also praised the
2 42
protection established by Brandenburg.
Conversely, the lower courts' treatment of threats has drawn
criticism from a number of commentators for failing to provide
rigorous First Amendment protection as intended by the Supreme
Court. 4 3 "Most often, [lower courts] cite Watts as support for the
proposition that threats stand outside the coverage of the First
interpretation of the statement, the test is also a hearer-based test. Packard, supra
note 131, at 253; see also Gey, supra note 18, at 572 (noting that under this standard,
the Ninth Circuit would have found the statements made by Evers at issue in
Claiborne Hardwareunprotected).
240. See Kobil, supra note 18, at 236-37; Packard, supra note 131, at 248
(documenting that "Brandenburg was lauded for providing greater First Amendment
protections for protesters using incendiary speech after a long history of very
restrictive decisions by the Court relying on the clear and present danger test").
241. See Kobil, supra note 18, at 241. Kobil further defends the Brandenburgtest
as being workable, an improvement of content-sensitive approaches and permissive of
provocative speech. Id. at 235. Similarly, Gey has remarked that "[bly the 1970s, the
Court was rigorously enforcing a constitutional standard that makes it virtually
impossible for the government to win a case against a speaker making political
pronouncements in the absence of some evidence that the speaker has participated
directly in the planning or implementation of some specific criminal activity." Gey,
supra note 18, at 544-45.
242. See, e.g., Kelner, supra note 185, at 288-89 (maintaining that "[f]or advocates
of the civil libertarian tradition and First Amendment law, Brandenburg... stands as
a signal triumph").
243. See, e.g., Gey, supra note 18, at 545, 548 (labeling the contradictory standards
in the lower courts as "unjustified" and arguing that the implication of Watts,
Brandenburg and Hess is that in order for speech to be beyond the scope of First
Amendment protection, it must present an explicit threat when viewed objectively,
and the speaker must both intend for the threat to be carried out and take immediate
action to execute the threat). Packard, supra note 131, at 245-46.
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Amendment, rather than casting it as a bulwark of First Amendment
protection for heated political speech in the Brandenburg mold."2"
The objective test employed by the lower courts often overlooks the
speaker's purpose or intention and instead focuses on the reaction of
the listener. In order to remain consistent with Watts and our nation's
commitment to "uninhibited, robust and wide-open" debate, critics
assert that courts must give at least minimal consideration to the
subjective intent of the speaker when attempting to distinguish true
threats from political hyperbole.2 45
The shortcomings of the true threats doctrine highlighted by critics
are further brought to light when the alleged threat is relayed in an
implicit, rather than explicit, manner. In such cases, identification of a
threat is dependent upon the context in which the speech takes place.
Critics recognize that a test to identify threatening speech that ignores
implicit threats may provide too little protection to victims of
potential violence, but a test that is overly sensitive may trample the
First Amendment rights of speakers entitled to engage in wide-open
and heated debate.24 6
Additionally, when the expression at issue does not explicitly
threaten its target, determining whether it should be properly
analyzed under Brandenburgor Watts may prove a daunting task. On
the one hand, the listener understands the message to be saying that
he will be harmed and is instilled with a sense of fear. From this
perspective, the statement looks like a threat to be analyzed under
Watts. On the other hand, because the speaker refrains from explicitly
threatening the target of the message, there is no evidence that the
speaker is conveying that he or someone acting in concert with him
will carry out the violence. In this light, the message appears to look
247
more like incitement governed by Brandenburg.
Critics have
observed that when faced with speech that approaches the somewhat
blurry line separating threats from incitement, courts may "mix and
match cases from both lines of precedent as if they were
interchangeable. ' 248
Identifying the type of speech presents a
significant challenge, as the categorization of the speech and the
precedent under which it is analyzed will have a decisive impact on
244. Kelner, supra note 185, at 289 (citation omitted). Kelner observes that "[i]n
striking contrast [to Brandenburg], Watts has withered. Lower courts, at both the
federal and state level, have gradually chipped away at the speech-protective 'true
threat' doctrine announced by the Watts Court." Id.
245. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 3, at 291 (citation omitted) ("[Fjear alone
cannot justify dissolving First Amendment protections, especially when speech
pertains to issues of public concern. .. "). Id. at 295.
246. See Packard, supra note 131, at 237.
247. Commentators have perceived that Brandenburgdoes not conclusively resolve
the issue of whether indirect unlawful advocacy is punishable. See Crump, supra note
150.
248. Kelner, supra note 185, at 289 (citation omitted).
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the final outcome. 249 The problem of how courts should deal with
implicit threats is further strained when they are buried within
political speech or involve a matter of public concern.
The existence of this gray area-and perhaps the root of the
"mixing and matching" phenomenon-can be traced to the
overlapping discussion of threats and incitement seen in Claiborne
Hardware.2 0 Despite the Court's acknowledgment of the threatening
nature of Evers's speech, its analysis clearly followed Brandenburg,
mentioning Watts only twice in footnotes. 5 1 While some have
252
questioned the Court's use of Brandenburg in Claiborne Hardware,
it is important to note that it was the merchants, not the targets of the
alleged threats, who raised the claim that Evers's speech fell outside
the scope of First Amendment protection. 253 The merchants' claim
was based on Evers's use of threats as a means to coerce the
community into participating in the boycott.25 4
As far as the
merchants were concerned, Evers's speeches qualified as incitement
of unlawful action.25 5 If the members of the black community who
were targets of the threatening speeches had initiated the suit, it 256
is
likely that the Court would have analyzed the case under Watts.
The plausibility that Claiborne Hardware could have been analyzed
under Watts highlights the thin line separating the two doctrines and
provides a potential source of confusion for lower courts confronted
with implicit threats. As discussed in the next two sections, Planned
Parenthood confirmed the existence of confusion in determining
which doctrine to apply to the analysis of implicit threats.

249. See infra Part II.C.; Kelner, supra note 185, at 289.
250. See Gey, supra note 18, at 552 (remarking that "[in light of the central role
threats played in speech challenged in Claiborne Hardware, it is mystifying that
Claiborne Hardware has had virtually no effect on the development of the law of
threats in the lower courts"). But see Rohr, supra note 155, at 22-24 (acknowledging
that while Gey's argument has "considerable force," the position that the Court
intended for Claiborne Hardwareto influence the treatment of threats is undercut by
the opinion's failure to cite Watts, coupled with the Court's subsequent reference to
threats in R.A. V. and Madsen).
251. See Kelner, supra note 185, at 303; Packard, supra note 131, at 248; Rohr,
supra note 155, at 13-14 (noting that Justice Stevens addressed Evers's statements in
terms of advocacy rather than threats).
252. See, e.g., Rohr, supra note 155, at 14 ("All in all, the use of Brandenburgin the
ClaiborneHardwaredecision is somewhat perplexing.").
253. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
256. See Berlin, supra note 3, at 30 ("[W]hen a threat is alleged to cause the listener
to act against a third party, as in the actual facts in Claiborne Hardware, while the
speaker may be liable to the recipient of the threat for making that threat, the speaker
is liable to the third party only if the Brandenburgimminence test is satisfied.").
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B. Planned Parenthood v. ACLA: Background
In 1999, several physicians and two clinics offering reproductive
services 257 filed suit in response to being featured in materials
published and circulated by the ACLA in "a campaign of terror and
intimidation. ' 258 The physicians alleged that when taken in context,
the ACLA's acts violated the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
Act ("FACE"). 2 5 9 FACE § 248(a)(1) prohibits any one who
by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally
injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure,
intimidate or interfere with any person because that person is or has
been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or
any other class 26of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive
health services.

0

The physicians claimed that the "Deadly Dozen" poster, the
"Wanted" poster featuring Dr. Crist and the "Nuremberg Files"
website published by the ACLA constituted true threats in violation
of FACE.
1. The "Deadly Dozen" Poster
Reminiscent of the old Wild West posters issued to capture outlaws,
the "Deadly Dozen" poster featured thirteen physicians "Guilty of
Crimes Against Humanity. "261 Names, addresses and phone numbers
of the thirteen individuals, along with a "$5,000 Reward for
information leading to arrest, conviction and revocation of license to
practice medicine" appeared in the poster.2 62 Planned Parenthood
plaintiffs, Dr. Elizabeth Newhall, Dr. James Newhall and Dr. Warren

257. The plaintiffs, Planned Parenthood of the ColumbialWillamette, Inc. and
Portland Feminist Women's Health Center (doing business as All Women's Health
Services), Dr. Robert Crist, Dr. Warren Hern, Dr. Elizabeth Newhall and Dr. James
Newhall will be referred to collectively as "the physicians" unless otherwise specified.
258. Planned Parenthood v. ACLA, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1185 (D. Or. 1998).
259. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1996).
260. Id. § 248(a)(1); Planned Parenthood v. ACLA, 945 F. Supp. 1355, 1365 (D.
Or. 1996) [hereinafter Planned Parenthood 1]. The physicians also alleged violations
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §
1962 (1988), Oregon RICO, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (which
they later dropped). Planned Parenthood I, 945 F. Supp. at 1362; see Hentoff, supra
note 207. This Note will only address the plaintiffs' claims under FACE.
261. Planned Parenthood I, 945 F. Supp. at 1362; see Richard Raysman & Peter
Brown, Extreme Speech on the Internet, N.Y .L.J., June 8, 1999, at 3; O'Neil, supra
note 44, at 62; Berlin supra note 3, at 26-27.
262. Planned Parenthood 1, 945 F. Supp. at 1362 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Originally unveiled at a 1995 conference in Washington, D.C., the poster
was republished several times at later events and in defendants' periodicals. See Fein,
supra note 3; O'Neil, supra note 44, at 62 (noting that the information contained in
the posters "would easily enable an anti-abortion activist to locate and harass the
targeted physician").
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Hern, were three of the listed physicians.26 3 The poster disclosed
Hern's city of residence and the home address of the Newhalls.26

Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") contacted
doctors listed in the Deadly Dozen poster the day after its release.265
The doctors were warned to take safety precautions and were offered

for them and
24-hour personal protection of the U.S. Marshal Service
267
their families.

266

The doctors heeded the warning.

2. The Dr. Crist "Wanted" Poster
A similar poster featuring Planned Parenthoodplaintiff Dr. Robert
Crist was published by the ACLA during an August 1995 event in St.
Louis, Missouri.268 It offered $500 to "any ACLA organization that

successfully persuades Crist to turn from his child killing through
activities within ACLA guidelines. ,269 The physician's photograph,
along with his home and business addresses, were displayed in the
poster. 270 The St. Louis police alerted him immediately of the
publication and warned him that it posed a threat to his personal
safety.271
3. The "Nuremberg Files" Website
The Nuremberg Files website, modeled after the files compiled on

Nazi officers following World War

11,272

disclosed the names and

personal information of abortion providers, clinic employees and
owners, law enforcement officials involved in protecting access to
abortion services, judges, politicians and supporters of abortion
rights.273 The personal information furnished by the site about
abortion providers-or "baby butchers," as the site had dubbed

263. Planned Parenthood v. ACLA, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1132 (D. Or. 1999)
[hereinafter PlannedParenthoodIII].
264. Id.
265. Id. See Berlin, supra note 3, at 26-27; Fein supra note 3.
266. PlannedParenthoodIII, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1132.
267. Wearing bulletproof vests was among the precautions taken. See Berlin supra
note 3, at 27; Fein, supra note 3; Quinn, supra note 127.
268. See Berlin, supra note 3, at 27; Raysman & Brown, supra note 261, at 3.
269. Berlin, supra note 3, at 27 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
270. Id.
271. PlannedParenthood III, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1133.
272. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
Following World War II,
information was gathered on Nazi officers being tried for crimes against humanity.
The compilation of such material was known as the "Nuremberg Files," named for
the German city in which the trials were being held.
273. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 261, at 3. The Nuremberg Files listed
approximately 200 doctors and over 200 others. Bill Clinton, Al Gore, Mary Tyler
Moore, Whoopi Goldberg and Justice White (despite his dissent in Roe v. Wade) and
President George W. Bush were among the more notable names listed. See id.;
Berlin, supra note 3, at 27.
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them2 7 -included their names, home and business addresses, pictures
and license plate numbers, as well as the names of their spouses and
children.2 5
The website encouraged its readers to "Visualize Abortionists on
Trial," displayed images of fetuses and dripping blood and identified
its main purpose as gathering information on abortion providers
which would one day be used against them in legal courts.276 The
website's legend explained that doctors listed in black font were still
working, those shaded in gray had been injured and names with
strikethroughs represented fatalities. 7 Dr. George Tiller, who was
shot in both arms by a pro-life activist in 1993, was one of the names
in gray. 2 8 A strike was placed through the name of Dr. Barnett
Slepian, an abortion27 9provider shot by a sniper outside of his home in
Buffalo, New York.
4. Placing the Materials in Context: Violence Stemming from Prior
Publications
While the posters and website do not contain any explicit threats
against the physicians-a point the physicians conceded-the
physicians contended that a threat may emerge in light of the
surrounding circumstances. The formation of the ACLA arose out of
a splintering within the pro-life movement regarding the use of
274. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 261, at 3; Hentoff, supra note 207; Quinn,
supra note 127.
275. See Mauro, supra note 128, at 1; Verhovek, supra note 2.
276. See Debra J. Saunders, Pro-Life Murder Inc., S.F. Chron., Feb. 7, 1999;
Volokh, supra note 3. Following the initial presentation of the Nuremberg Files at an
ACLA event in January 1996, the Files were sent to Neal Horsley, the creator of the
website. Horsley was not named as a defendant. See O'Neil, supra note 44, at 62;
David Wastell, Women at Risk in New Anti-Abortion Tactic: Web Site Publishes
Photos of Women Seeking Abortions, Nat'l Post, June 10, 2002, at A14, available at
2002 WL 22464154. The hard files were destroyed at the onset of the suit. Planned
ParenthoodIII, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1134.
277. See Berlin, supra note 3, at 27; Fein, supra note 3. As O'Neil describes: "The
Nuremberg Files not only targeted doctors and clinic staff who performed abortions;
they also celebrated the tragically frequent occasions on which the lives of doctors
and other clinic staff members were taken by militant anti-abortionists." O'Neil, supra
note 44, at 62.
278. Planned Parenthood III, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1132. Dr. Tiller, or "Tiller the
Killer" as the Nuremberg Files website referred to him, was also featured on the
"Deadly Dozen" poster. Id. At the time of the shooting, Dr. Tiller's assailant had
issues of Life Advocate, a magazine published by defendant ALM, that contained
identifying information about him in her possession. Id. Following the incident,
defendants ALM, Bray, Burnett, Dodds, McMillan and Stover publicly advocated for
her acquittal, including an editorial piece published in the October 1993 edition of
Life Advocate in which Burnett wrote: "Shelley was a courageous women [sic] that
we were very proud to be associated with." Id.
279. See Saunders, supra note 276. A disembodied hand, used to draw strikes
through the names of fatalities, crossed out Dr. Slepian's name on the very day of his
murder. O'Neil, supra note 44, at 62.
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Defendants Burnett, Foreman and McMillan were

281
compelled to forfeit their positions as leaders of Operation Rescue
because of their resounding commitment to the use of force and
justifiable homicide.282
In his testimony during the Planned

Parenthood trial, defendant Burnett stated: "[I]f someone was to
condemn any violence against abortion, they probably wouldn't have
felt comfortable working with us. '28 3 This declaration
illustrates the
28
nature of the sharp division among pro-life activists. I
The physicians were most alarmed not by the actual words
employed in the posters and website, but by the connotations and
implications the words had come to assume when taken in context.285
The physicians' fears derived from the murders of several physicians
featured in previous ACLA publications of a similar nature.28 6 Prior
to the publication of the Deadly Dozen poster, the ACLA had
prepared and published a comparable line of wanted posters.28 7
On March 10, 1993, Dr. David Gunn was shot and killed outside of
the Pensacola, Florida clinic where he performed abortions. A
wanted poster, featuring his name, photograph and other personal
information identifying him, had been released before his murder.288
On August 21, 1993, Dr. George Patterson, whose name, physical
description and address had also been divulged on a wanted poster,
was shot and killed in Mobile, Alabama. 289 Dr. John Bayard Britton,
who had replaced Dr. Gunn and whose name, photograph and
physical description appeared on an "unwanted" poster, fell victim to
280. See Berlin, supra note 3, at 26; Vitiello, supra note 30, at 1243.
281. Operation Rescue is a pro-life advocacy group dedicated to furthering its
agenda through non-violent means. See Planned Parenthood III, 41 F. Supp. 2d at
1136. Upon forfeiting their positions at Operation Rescue, the three named
defendants founded the ACLA. Id.
282. Id.; see Berlin, supra note 3, at 26.
283. PlannedParenthoodII, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1136.
284. See Hentoff, supra note 207 (recalling that the late Cardinal Bernardin
encouraged pro-lifers to unite in opposition against "assaults on life"); Saunders,
supra note 276 (quoting executive director of the Life Legal Defense Foundation in
Sacramento as stating that during her involvement in the pro-life movement over the
past ten years, she knows nobody that would condone what Planned Parenthood
defendants have done).
285. In the words of Maria Vullo, attorney for Planned Parenthood, crossing out
the names of fatalities "is a hit list, a clear message to those not crossed out that 'you
will be next."' Hentoff, supra note 207.
286. See Mauro, supra note 128; O'Neil, supra note 44, at 62-63; Volokh, supra note
3.
287. These previous publications contribute to the physicians' claim that the
materials at issue are part of a broader campaign of violence and intimidation. See
Berlin, supra note 3, at 26; Vicki Saporta, National Abortion FederationStatement,
U.S. Newswire, May 16, 2002, availableat 2002 WL 4577588.
288. See Berlin, supra note 3, at 26; Fein, supra note 3. The individual defendants
of Planned Parenthood endorsed the acquittal of Michael Griffin, who was later
convicted for Dr. Gunn's murder, on a theory of justifiable homicide. Id.
289. See Berlin, supra note 3, at 26; Fein, supra note 3.
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a shooting outside the same Pensacola clinic. Both Dr. Britton and his

volunteer escort, James Barrett, were killed and Barrett's wife was

wounded.29 °
In the wake of each murder, the ACLA publicly praised the

murderers and advocated their acquittal on the theory of justified
homicide. 291 Both the physicians and the ACLA were aware that

posters had targeted the slain doctors preceding their deaths. 2 91 This
knowledge, coupled with Life Advocate's2 93 chronicling of these
events, supported the district court's finding in Planned
Parenthood
2 94

III that "[t]hese murders were not isolated events.

The appropriate analysis to apply in Planned Parenthood-

incitement or true threats-perplexed judges and commentators alike.
The physicians presented their claim as one of true threats, urging an
analysis following Watts.2 95 Conversely, the ACLA asserted that the

materials amounted to nothing more than political advocacy clearly
within their First Amendment rights to free speech. As demonstrated
by Planned Parenthood's progression through the Ninth Circuit,

because of the diverging standards of the incitement and true threats
doctrines, the precedent applied had a determinative impact on
whether or not the ACLA's materials were encompassed by their
lawful exercise of free speech.
C. Planned Parenthood's Progression Through the Ninth Circuit

1. The Trial Court
The district court identified its task as determining whether the
ACLA's conduct amounted to a "true threat" as prohibited by
FACE. 29 6 The court observed that the Ninth Circuit had recently
confirmed that its test to analyze threats consisted of an objective
inquiry as to how a reasonable person would foresee his statement
would be interpreted, considered in light of its factual context.297
290. See Berlin, supra note 3, at 26; Fein, supra note 3. Paul Hill, who had assisted
with the preparation of posters, was convicted on two counts of murder and one count
of attempted murder. Planned Parenthood III, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1135 (D. Or.
1999).
291. Id. at 1134-36. One means through which acquittals were advocated was the
circulation of "Defensive Action" petitions. Id. at 1134.
292. Id.
293. See supra note 278.
294. Planned ParenthoodIII, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1135.
295. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
296. Planned ParenthoodI, 945 F. Supp. 1355, 1370-71 (D. Or. 1996). The court
noted that prohibiting "true threats" under FACE did not violate a speaker's First
Amendment rights. Id. The court rejected the ACLA's assertion that the physicians
were actually pursuing an incitement to violence theory to be analyzed according to
Brandenburgv. Ohio. Id. at 1371 n.13.
297. Id. at 1371 (citing Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir.

2004]

1327

FIRST AMENDMENT

Ultimately, the jury would resolve the
issue of whether the ACLA's
2 98
materials constituted a "true threat.
The ACLA challenged the constitutionality of FACE under the
Commerce
Clause, 299 Fourteenth
Amendment 3°
and First

Amendment. 3 '

The court considered the constitutionality of the

FACE statute, which was designed to protect individuals obtaining or

providing reproductive services from the threat of force, injury or
intimidation.3

2

In

declaring

FACE constitutional,

the

court

recognized the government's "strong interest in protecting a woman's
freedom to seek lawful medical or counseling services in connection
with her pregnancy 3 3 and in "protecting patients and staff from
violence and harm and protecting reproductive health facilities from

1996); see supra Part II.A.2.b. The court further noted that neither the fact that the
threats were made implicitly, rather than explicitly, and that they were announced
publicly, as opposed to privately, would affect the objective test for determining
whether the threat constitutes a "true threat." Planned Parenthood1, 945 F. Supp. at
1372 n.14.
298. Planned ParenthoodI, 945 F. Supp. at 1372 n14.
299. The ACLA contended that FACE violates the Commerce Clause by
regulating activity insufficiently connected to interstate commerce. Id. at 1373. In
light of Congress's findings when enacting FACE-"that violence, threats of force,
and physical obstructions directed at persons seeking or providing reproductive
health services substantially affect interstate commerce"-the court held FACE
constitutional under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 1374-75.
300. The ACLA argued that the Fourteenth Amendment does not grant Congress
the authority to regulate private conduct through FACE. Id. at 1373.
301. The ACLA advanced several reasons why FACE violates the First
Amendment: (1) FACE impermissibly prohibits speech based on its anti-abortion
viewpoint; (2) FACE creates a content-based restriction by regulating speech based
on whether it frightens the listener; and (3) in failing to define key terms and
regulating speech that cannot be categorized as "fighting words" or "imminent threats
of lawless action," FACE is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Id.
302. Because the First Amendment generally prohibits the government from
proscribing speech, content-based regulations are subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 1375
(citations omitted); see supra note 141 and accompanying text. To prevent the
government from driving ideas from the marketplace and infringing upon the
fundamental right to free speech, "the most exacting scrutiny [is applied] to
regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech
because of its content." Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). To
survive strict scrutiny, the government must demonstrate that "its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end." Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 118 (1991) (citations omitted). Content-neutral regulations do not pose the same
threat to First Amendment rights as content-based regulations, and are therefore
reviewed under an intermediate level of scrutiny. A statute survives intermediate
scrutiny if "it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
377 (1968). The district court concluded that because FACE was neither content- nor
viewpoint-based, an intermediate level of scrutiny was the appropriate standard for
determining its constitutionality. PlannedParenthood1, 945 F. Supp. at 1377.
303. Planned Parenthood1, 945 F. Supp. at 1377 (quotations omitted).
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physical destruction or damage."3 °4 This conclusion was consistent

with previous determinations made by the Eighth, Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits.3 °5

Following its determination that FACE was constitutional, the
court turned its focus to the ACLA's materials. The ACLA insisted

that the court should not resort to a contextual analysis of the posters
and website, as none of the materials explicitly threatened the
physicians. 3 6 The ACLA asserted that the Ninth Circuit required

"that a threat be 'unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific'
both on its face and in context before it can constitute a true
threat."3

7

The District Court, unpersuaded by this argument, adhered

to the physicians' position that the Ninth Circuit maintained an
objective speaker-based test, which allowed statements to be

evaluated in full context.30 8
Applying the standard articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Lovell v.
Unified Poway School District, °9 the jury was charged with the
determination of whether a reasonable person would have foreseen
that the physicians would have construed the materials published by

the ACLA, when taken in context, as a serious expression of an intent
304. Id. (citing Am. Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 651 (4th Cir. 1995)).
305. See United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 923-24 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding
FACE a content-neutral regulation and therefore subject to an intermediate level of
scrutiny); Am. Life League, 47 F.3d at 651 (same); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517,
1521-22 (11th Cir. 1995) (same)
306. Planned Parenthood v. ACLA, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1189 (D. Or. 1998).
[hereinafter PlannedParenthoodII].
307. Id. (quoting United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976)
(emphasis omitted)). In support of its argument, the ACLA cited Lovell v. Poway
Unified School District, 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996), where the Ninth Circuit had
cited Kelner, as in "accord" with Ninth Circuit precedent. Planned ParenthoodH, 23
F. Supp. 2d at 1189. According to the ACLA, this language reflected the Ninth
Circuit's adoption of the Second Circuit's narrow construction of the term threat as
set forth in Kelner. Id. The physicians countered this argument, in part, by citing the
Second Circuit's revised standard, established in United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45 (2d
Cir. 1994). PlannedParenthoodH, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1190; see supra notes 217-26 and
accompanying text.
308. Planned ParenthoodH, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1189-90, 1193-94. In support of their
position, the physicians relied on standards set forth in United States v. OrozcoSantillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990), and Malik. PlannedParenthoodH, 23 F.
Supp. 2d at 1189-90; see also supra notes 217-39 and accompanying text. The Oregon
branch of the American Civil Liabilities Union ("ACLU") filed an amicus brief
urging the court that, in order to ensure that the First Amendment right to political
advocacy is not compromised in the name of threats, it must consider both objective
and subjective intent. Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc.,
Planned Parenthood H (Civil No. 95-1671-JO) available at http://www.acluor.org/litigation/plannedparenthood/ppbrief.htm; see supra notes 243-45; infra note
321 and accompanying text. Despite the ACLU's effort, the District Court refrained
from altering its test, viewing FACE as adequately factoring the issue of subjective
intent into its analysis. PlannedParenthoodIII, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1155 & n.1.
309. 90 F.3d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Ninth Circuit adheres to an
objective speaker-based standard in determining the presence of a true threat); see
supra notes 236-39 and accompanying text.
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to inflict or cause serious harm. 3 10 Based on the jury's conclusion that
the Ninth Circuit's reasonable speaker standard had been satisfied,

the District Court declared that the Deadly Dozen poster, Crist poster
'311

and the Nuremberg Files website each constituted a "true threat.
Accordingly, District Court Judge Jones issued a permanent
injunction prohibiting defendants from: (1) publishing or distributing

the Deadly Dozen poster; (2) publishing or distributing the Crist
poster; and (3) contributing materials to the Nuremberg Files website
with a specific intent to threaten.3 12 The physicians were awarded
$109 million in punitive damages.3 3
2. Three-Judge Panel of the Ninth Circuit
On appeal before a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit,3 4 the
ACLA stressed the highly protective nature of the Brandenburg
standard. The ACLA again emphasized that the physicians' fear that

the posters may prompt others to resort to violence was "nothing
more than a disguised incitement theory" and further argued that
allowing the temporal link between the previously published posters
and acts of violence to determine whether the ACLA's political
protest should be deemed as protected speech would greatly infringe
upon their First Amendment rights.3 5 Judge Kozinski, writing for the
unanimous panel,316 found that the case was clearly controlled by
317 In finding Planned
ClaiborneHardware.
Parenthoodand Claiborne
Hardware analogous, Judge Kozinski noted: "While Charles Evers
and the defendants in our case pursued very different political goals,
the two cases have one key thing in common: Political activists used
310. Planned Parenthood11, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1194.
311. Id.
312. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 261, at 3. Because the plaintiffs did not sue
Horsley or his site, the injunction did not apply directly to the website itself. In light
of the controversy, however, MindSpring, Horlsey's Internet service provider,
removed the Nuremberg Files website. Horsley responded with a lawsuit for
abridgement of his free expression as a subscriber. See O'Neil, supra note 44, at 64;
Byrne, supra note 18.
313. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 261, at 3.
314. Planned Parenthood v. ACLA, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter
PlannedParenthoodIV].
315. Portland Porcupine, Transcript of the Planned Parenthood v. ACLA 9th
Circuit
Court
of
Appeals
Arguments,
available
at
http://www.portlandporcupine.com/ppvacla/9thcircuitargument.shtml
(last visited
Feb. 1, 2004). At Oral Arguments, defense counsel asserted: "At the summary
judgment stage, the District Court acknowledged that the communications at issue
are devoid of any expressly or even apparently threatening language. That, in itself, is
an unprecedented departure from prior case law.... This is a sui generis case
involving nonthreatening speech in which a context of threatening opinions was used
to make the nonthreatening speech a threat." Id.
316. Planned ParenthoodIV, 244 F.3d at 1012.
317. Id. at 1019-20 (discussing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886
(1982)).
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Thus, Judge

Kozinski concluded that the posters and website did not satisfy the

elements of Brandenburg and were worthy of First Amendment
protection.3" 9

While the posters and website may have facilitated violent antiabortion activists' ability to locate and identify the doctors,3 20 the fact
that political speech increased the likelihood that someone would be

harmed at an indefinite time in the future by an unrelated third party
did not serve as sufficient grounds for denying the speech First
Amendment protection.32 1
Absent any evidence that ACLA
"authorized, ratified, or directly threatened" the violence, the

published materials were clearly protected by the First Amendment
322
according to the rule set forth in ClaiborneHardware.

Noting the difficulty in analyzing statements that do not explicitly
threaten, Judge Kozinski queried: "Can
message that the language alone leaves
context, Judge Kozinski acknowledged
environment on a speaker posed a threat

context supply the violent
out? 3 23 With regard to
that imposing a violent
to free speech.3 24 Through

his opinion, Judge Kozinski joined the ranks of commentators
concerned that basing the determination of a true threat solely on the
fear it instills in the listener could significantly chill First Amendment
rights.32 5
In his final point, Judge Kozinski emphasized the significance of

statements made in public discourse as opposed to private interactions
and offered two bases for supporting this distinction.3 26

First, a

speaker delivering a message in private leaves the target with no
doubt that the message is intended for him.3 27 In contrast, political
statements delivered in public generally do not carry such a focus,
because they are usually intended, at least in part, to draw support for
the speaker's position.32 s Second, expressions concerning matters of
318. Planned Parenthood IV, 244 F.3d at 1014; see Volokh, supra note 3 (stating
that the Ninth Circuit had to rule in favor of the speakers, as it was bound by
ClaiborneHardware).
319. See supra Part II.A.1.
320. Planned ParenthoodIV, 244 F.3d at 1013.
321. Id. at 1015. Labeling the posters and website as unprotected threats turned on
"whether ACLA's statements could reasonably be construed as saying that ACLA
(or its agents) would physically harm doctors who did not stop performing abortions."
Id. at 1017; see O'Neil, supra note 44, at 65.
322. Planned Parenthood IV, 244 F.3d at 1014, 1019-20; see O'Neil, supra note 44,
at 65; Volokh, supra note 3.
323. Planned ParenthoodIV, 244 F.3d at 1018.
324. Id. at 1018; see supra notes 150-51. Judge Kozinski further noted that the
violence documented in the record did not generally involve the named defendants.
Planned ParenthoodIV, 244 F.3d at 1018.
325. Id. at 1015; see supra note 207, 308 and accompanying text.
326. PlannedParenthoodIV,244 F.3d at 1018-20.
327. Id. at 1018-19.
328. Id. at 1019.
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public concern delivered through the normal channels of
communication lie at the core of the First Amendment and are
afforded the maximum level of protection.3 29 As the three-judge
Ninth Circuit panel found that Planned ParenthoodIV was controlled
by ClaiborneHardware,it held that the jury verdict could not stand.33
3. En Banc Panel of the Ninth Circuit

The jury verdict of $109 million in favor of the physicians was
subsequently reinstated on a second appeal in front of a deeply
divided en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit in July 2002.331 Writing for
the narrow majority, Judge Rymer dismissed the argument that
Claiborne Hardware was closely analogous, thereby holding Watts as
the only precedent binding the court.332 No longer encumbered by the
strict standards of Brandenburg,the Wanted posters and Nuremberg

Files website were once again cast outside the protective reach of the
First Amendment.
The majority maintained that it was well-established that the Ninth
Circuit's test focused on whether a reasonable speaker would foresee

that the listener would perceive the statement as a threat in light of its
entire factual context,
of the listeners under
that context provided
were not merely a

including the surrounding events and reactions
the circumstances.333 The majority maintained
the basis for finding that the Wanted posters
political statement.33 4
While not explicitly

threatening, "they connote something they do not literally say, yet
both the actor and the recipient get the message."

335

Under the Ninth

329. Id.
330. Id. at 1019-20.
331. Planned Parenthood v. ACLA, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
[hereinafter Planned Parenthood V]. En banc hearings are not favored in the Ninth
Circuit and ordinarily will not be granted unless: (1) en banc consideration is needed
to secure or maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or (2) the proceeding
involves a question of exceptional importance. See Fed. R. App. P. 35; see also
Mauro, supra note 128, at 1 (noting that the opinion "ran 118 pages long, with three
dissents, including those by ideological opposites Stephen Reinhardt and Alex
Kozinski"). The punitive damages portion of the decision was remanded to determine
if the award was excessive. See id.; Quinn, supra note 127.
332. PlannedParenthoodV, 290 F.3d at 1072.
333. Id. at 1075-76. The majority held that "threat of force," as used in FACE, was
consistent with the Ninth Circuit's definition of a threat. Id. at 1077. The ACLU's
appellate brief supported affirmance of the district court, despite the court's
adherence to an objective test, because the jury instruction included a subjective
intent element with regard to FACE. Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU Foundation of
Oregon, Inc., Planned Parenthood IV (No. 99-35320), available at http://www.acluor.org/litigation/plannedparenthood/pp9thCircBrf.html. The majority declined from
modifying its test, however, concluding that subjective intent was sufficiently covered
by FACE. Planned ParenthoodV, 290 F.3d at 1075-76.
334. Id. at 1079. Judge Berzon objected to the extent of the majority's contextual
analysis. Id. at 1114 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
335. Id. at 1085.
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Circuit standard, the Deadly Dozen poster, Crist poster and
Nuremberg Files website qualified as true threats unworthy of First
Amendment protection.336
The dissenting opinions proffered by Judges Kozinski, Berzon and
Reinhardt chastised the majority's reasoning as fatally flawed.337 Due
to the implicit nature of the threats and lack of evidence that ACLA
or someone in association with them would carry out the threats, the
dissent dismissed the majority position as an unjustified deviation
338 Additionally, the
from the central holding of Claiborne Hardware.
dissent vehemently rejected the majority opinion for its failure to
distinguish between threats voiced in a public arena and those relayed
within private confines.339 Judge Reinhardt opined: "Political speech,
ugly or frightening as it may sometimes be, lies at the heart of our
democratic process. Private threats delivered one-on-one do not. The
majority's unwillingness
to recognize the difference is extremely
3 40
troublesome.
Following the denial for a rehearing en banc,341 the ACLA applied
for certiorari to the Supreme Court. On June 27, 2003, the Court
entered its decision to deny certiorari. 42
The next part argues that applying the Supreme Court's approach
to competing rights in the areas of defamation, privacy and First
Amendment rights of public employees to true threats would improve
the current state of the doctrine. Part III proposes introducing the
public-private dichotomy developed in New York Times and its
progeny to alleged threats accompanied by an expression of political
336. Id. at 1088.
337. Id. at 1092.
338. See O'Neil, supra note 44, at 63 (noting "[s]uch menacing but unfocused
statements would almost certainly be viewed as protected speech in other federal
circuits and many state supreme courts").
339. Planned ParenthoodV, 290 F.3d at 1089; see Quinn, supra note 127. The need
for a distinction between publicly and privately stated threats remains a source of
discord among First Amendment scholars. See Gey, supra note 18, at 592-94
(supporting drawing such a distinction); Rohr, supra note 155, at 90-91 (finding the
distinction unnecessary).
340. Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1089 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting). Judge
Berzon's dissent proposed special rules for analyzing alleged threats expressed in
public discourse, which entailed: (1) eliminating a prerequisite of imminence or
immediacy of the threatened action for a statement made as part of a public speech to
be found a true threat; (2) a subjective intent on the part of the speaker that the
victims would understand the statement as an unequivocal threat that would be
executed by either the speaker or one of their agents or cohorts; and (3) that
unequivocal should be taken to mean unambiguous within the context. Planned
Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1106-11 (Berzon, J., dissenting). She noted that these rules
are consistent with ClaiborneHardware.Id. at 1111.
341. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette v. ACLA, No. 99-35320,
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 13829 (July 10, 2002).
342. ACLA v. Planned Parenthood, 123 S. Ct. 2637, 2637-38 (2003). Before
rendering its decision, the Court requested that the Solicitor General submit a brief
reflecting the government's view. The Solicitor General suggested denying certiorari.
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debate or matter of public concern. The application of the publicprivate distinction, coupled with the Court's approach to balancing
competing interests discussed in Part I would provide greater
protection for targets of alleged threats without unnecessarily
infringing on the First Amendment rights of the speaker.
III. A NEW STANDARD FOR EVALUATING THREATS
In Watts v. United States,343 the Supreme Court unequivocally cast
"true threats" beyond the protective reach of the First Amendment.3"
The Watts precedent, however, provided lower courts with little more
than a directive to distinguish true threats from constitutionally
protected speech.345 Critics disparage true threats jurisprudence,
shaped significantly by the lower courts, for failing to provide rigorous
First Amendment protection.346 In sharp contrast to the protective
incitement doctrine, the shortcomings of the current state of true
threats jurisprudence poses a substantial threat to a speaker's capacity
to engage in heated political debate as guaranteed by the First
Amendment. The argument that the Court had intended for Watts to
establish a speech-protective rule is supported not only by the
opinion's own affirmation of our nation's unwavering commitment to
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" political debate,3 47 but by the
rigorous standard devised to evaluate incitement only two months
later in Brandenburg.3" It is illogical to infer that the Watts and
Brandenburgstandards, formulated within a two-month period of one
another for similar categories of speech by a Court with an undeniable
commitment to First Amendment rights, were intended to be as
divergent as Watts and Brandenburghave proven to be.
The extent of this divergence is illuminated by cases like Planned
Parenthoodv. ACLA. Planned Parenthood'spotential to emerge as a
defining case in First Amendment jurisprudence has earned it a great
deal of attention and stirred controversy among First Amendment
scholars and judges alike.349 Fueling the fervent debate is the question

343. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
344. Id. at 708; see supra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
345. In refraining from defining a "true threat" or proposing guidelines under
which alleged threats should be evaluated, the Supreme Court in effect bestowed the
development of the true threats doctrine on the lower courts. See supra notes 200-07
and accompanying text. While the argument has been raised that the language
employed in Watts did not actually grant lower courts a wide latitude to shape the true
threats doctrine, that the lower courts have in fact had a significant impact is generally
accepted by critics. See supra notes 243-44.
346. See supra notes 204-39, 243-46 and accompanying text.
347. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
348. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); see supra notes 181-82, 240-42 and
accompanying text.
349. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. That potential, however, ended with
the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari.
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as to how the ACLA's materials should properly be analyzed. ° Had
the current state of the true threats doctrine not been widely criticized
as an erosion of Watts, perhaps the precedent under which the
ACLA's materials are analyzed would not be the source of such
heated contention.
The decisive impact that this characterization of the ACLA's
materials had on the ultimate outcome of the case signals that the
First Amendment protection offered by the true threats doctrine is
inadequate. It is clear that if classified as incitement, the ACLA's
materials warrant First Amendment protection, as Brandenburg's
imminence requirement cannot be satisfied.35 Regardless of whether
one thinks Planned Parenthood was correctly decided, there is no
question that an objective standard-whether the ACLA would have
reasonably foreseen that the targeted physicians would believe that
they would be subject to physical violence 3 5 -- is substantially less
rigorous than the standards of Brandenburgand ClaiborneHardware.
This part argues that true threats jurisprudence could be improved
by adopting a new standard for evaluating implicit threats that are
accompanied by political debate or matters of public concern. Part
III.A. outlines the new standard, which imports the public-private
dichotomy developed in the constitutionalization of defamation353 and
calls for a balance between First Amendment and competing
fundamental rights similar to the balance invoked by the Supreme
Court in several areas of the law. Part III.B. applies the standard to
PlannedParenthood.
A. A New Standardfor Evaluating True Threats
Similar to cases arising in the areas of defamation,35 4 privacy355 and
public employment,35 6 true threats typically involve a clash between
First Amendment and other fundamental rights. The rationale for
denying First Amendment protection to true threats-to "protect[]
individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear
engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will
occur" 357 -acknowledges that threats infringe on the fundamental
rights to life and liberty. While the use of balancing tests in the
adjudication of First Amendment rights is generally avoided, the
Supreme Court has held balancing to be necessary in the resolution of
350. The nature of this debate is captured by the sharp division among the Ninth
Circuit judges. See supra Part II.C.3.
351. See supra Part II.A.1.; Berlin, supra note 3, at 28.
352. See supra Part II.A.2.b.
353. See supra Part I.A.
354. See supra Part I.A.
355. See supra Part I.B.
356. See supra Part I.C.
357. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
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First Amendment and competing fundamental rights in several areas
of the law. 358 Recognition of the need for such a balance reflects the
value and significance that the Court attributes to these other
fundamental rights.
The Court "has frequently reaffirmed that speech on public issues
occupies the 'highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
'
values,' and is entitled to special protection."3 59
Where the speech in
question does not involve issues of public concern, however, the Court
has repeatedly confirmed that competing fundamental rights may
overshadow First Amendment concerns.3 6
Allowing competing
fundamental rights to prevail under such circumstances does not
threaten robust or wide-open political debate or compromise the
values underlying the First Amendment.36 1 The Court's dedication to
striking an appropriate balance between First Amendment and
competing fundamental rights is manifest in the areas of defamation,
right to privacy and free speech within the scope of public
employment. The weight and consideration afforded to individual
rights in these areas of the law, coupled with the rationale for denying
First Amendment protection to true threats, supports the position that
such a balance should be factored into the adjudication of true threats.
Protecting individuals from true threats without compromising First
Amendment protection could be achieved by importing the privatepublic dichotomy developed in the constitutionalization of defamation
to the evaluation of implicit threats embedded in expressions
involving political debate or matters of public concern.36 2 While the
objective standard may provide a sufficient framework for explicit
threats, Planned Parenthoodhighlights the complexities of evaluating
implicit threats.36 3 Distinguishing between implicit threats aimed at
private individuals as opposed to public officials or figures would
assist courts in identifying speech attacking individuals rather than
voicing a political message.
358. See supra Part I.
359. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985)
(quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)); see supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 60-65, 111-12 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 60-65, 111-12 and accompanying text.
362. In discussion of threats, analogies to defamation have been made, but none
have suggested importing the public-private dichotomy to the true threats doctrine.
See Planned Parenthood IV,290 F.3d at 1102-04 (Berzon, J., dissenting); Calvert &
Richards, supra note 131, at 681-85; Vitiello, supra note 30, at 1229; see also Romero,
supra note 54 (advocating the application of the public-private dichotomy to
majorities and minorities in the analysis of hate speech).
363. See Part II.C.
364. It is important to note that with the exception of Claiborne Hardware, Watts
and the incitement cases reviewed by the Supreme Court "all involved speech that
could be characterized as political dissent." Vitiello, supra note 30, at 1220. In light
of this, how analogous these precedents are to cases such as Planned Parenthood is
debatable.
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This distinction is based on the assumption that while statements
targeting public officials and figures are usually categorized as core
political speech warranting the highest level of First Amendment
protection (and properly so), statements aimed at private individuals
do not necessarily deserve this label and level of protection.36 5
Generally, private citizens are not involved in matters of public
concern to the degree that they would be included in a speaker's
political message. Individuals involved in matters of public concern
more typically consist of public officials and figures. 3"
This
assumption does not encompass private individuals that have
voluntarily become involved in a matter of public concern to the
extent that they would be classified as a "limited" or "special
purpose" public figure.3 67 Additionally, the distinction should only be
invoked when the statement targets specific individuals, as opposed to
a statement referring abstractly to a group of private individuals.
Accepting the presumption that political debate does not generally
entail expressions targeting private individuals, a speaker expressing
an alleged threat targeting a private individual should be required to
show that the defense of political debate is more than a mere pretext
before the statement is awarded the highest level of First Amendment
protection. Supreme Court jurisprudence in defamation, privacy and
public employment definitively establishes the need to strike an
appropriate balance between competing First Amendment and
individual rights.3" Precedents in these areas consistently reiterate
the special level of protection granted to speech concerning public
issues. In circumstances where the speaker's expression consists of
365. Vitiello's observations support this proposition:
[J]ust as in the defamation cases involving private figures, protection of
individuals' interests increases as the area of discussion is further from
legitimate public debate. As the speaker moves from discussion of issues of
public concern, such as governmental policy, to revelation of private data
about individuals, a fact-finder is more justified in finding that the speaker's
intent is not to engage in public discourse.
Vitiello, supra note 30, at 1229; see supra Part I.
366. The Supreme Court's justification for applying the public-private dichotomy
to defamation, as articulated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45
(1974), can be applied to threats. The Court reasoned that the heightened standard
placed on public figures was justified because they had a more realistic opportunity to
combat a reputation-attacking statement through effective channels of
communication; society had a greater interest in public figures and officials; and they
had, to a certain extent, invited comment and attention by stepping into the public
light. Id.; see supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
Considering these
justifications in light of the reasons set forth for denying First Amendment protection
to threats-to protect individuals from the fear and disruption of violence and the
possibility that violence may actually occur-supports importing the dichotomy to
threats jurisprudence, as private citizens generally have not invited nor have the
means to publicly counter threats contained in a political message.
367. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976); Waldbaum v.
Fairchild Publ'ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
368. See supra Part I.
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core political speech or matters of public concern, the speaker's First
Amendment rights invariably trump the competing rights of the
individual.36 9 As the expression in question moves from core political
speech towards the periphery of the First Amendment's reach, the
rights of the individual assume a greater weight. In cases where the
Court was faced with balancing individual rights against speech that
was not classified as core political speech or matters of public concern,
the weight attributed to First Amendment rights diminished, and the
Court exhibited a greater sensitivity to the rights of the individual.3 7 °
Speech targeting private individuals that is not accompanied by a
legitimate political message does not promote the principles
underlying the First Amendment, and thus is not compelling enough
to defeat the competing fundamental rights.37 ' When the target of the
message is a private individual, blindly accepting the speaker's
defense that he was engaging in political debate or addressing a
matter of public concern may compromise the rights of the individual
and award the speaker a higher level of First Amendment protection
than he actually deserves. Accordingly, if a speaker of an alleged
threat can satisfy the court that the portion of his statement targeting
a private individual does in fact express a valid and legitimate political
message, the speech warrants the highest level of protection. If,
however, the court finds that the claim of political debate is
pretextual, the speech warrants a lower level of protection and must
be balanced against the competing individual rights of the target.372
An inquiry into whether a message targeting a private individual
claiming to be political debate or involving a matter of public concern
is in fact pretextual prevents a clever speaker from employing the
First Amendment as a means of attacking individuals by coupling the
less favored speech with an expression deserving the utmost
protection.
Applying the public-private dichotomy to true threats and requiring
a speaker targeting a private individual to demonstrate that a claim of
political debate or matter of public concern is more than a pretextual
guise would strengthen the degree of protection currently afforded to
First Amendment concerns without trampling on competing rights.
First Amendment concerns played a pivotal role in the development
of defamation, privacy and public employment jurisprudence.3 73 The
rationale underlying Supreme Court precedents in these areas justifies
369. See supra notes 37-58, 84-89, 98-101, 109-12 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 60-65, 116-22 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 60-65, 116-22, 123-25 and accompanying text; Greenawalt,
supra note 26, at 272 ("The communicative value of [factual disclosures intended to
produce specific crimes] is relatively slight.")
372. If political debate is pretext, the speech in question is not worthy of the
highest level of protection as it is not furthering the principles underlying the First
Amendment.
373. See supra Part I.
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taking a similar approach to threats. The language employed in Watts

and Brandenburg, reflecting the same First Amendment concerns

advanced in New York Times and its progeny,374 further supports the

implementation of this framework. Additionally, in considering
whether the political debate or matter of public concern defense is
pretextual, the framework incorporates an element of the speaker's
subjective intent into the analysis-thereby correcting the principal
drawback associated with the objective standard and bridging the gap
between the Watts and Brandenburgprecedents.3 75
B. Application of the New Standard to Planned Parenthood
The materials at issue in Planned Parenthood provide an ideal

example of where individuals who threaten and intimidate private

individuals may be using the First Amendment as a shield.376 The

ACLA's previous publications championing justifiable homicide and
advocating the acquittal of the assailants of abortion providers leave
no question as to their position on abortion.3 77 While abortion
constitutes an issue of public concern, the ACLA should be required

to demonstrate to the court that the inclusion of information relating
to the physicians, as private citizens, comprised a legitimate aspect of
their engaging in political debate.378 More specifically, the ACLA
should have to prove that the inclusion of the physicians' photographs,
phone numbers, addresses, license plate numbers and names of family
members relayed through the posters and website played a legitimate
role in the ACLA's protest against the practice of abortion.379

374. In all of the opinions, the Supreme Court manifested its dedication to ensuring
that speech involving political debate or matters of public concern would receive
special protection.
375. See supra Part II.A.3.
376. As Ira Glasser, Executive Director of the ACLU, points out:
It is one thing to say that all abortion providers deserve to die. It is quite
another to publish detailed information on wanted posters about particular
doctors-their photos, names, cars (with license plate numbers), home
addresses, names of their children, where their children go to school, etc.and then triumphantly cross out their names when particular doctors are
killed.
Glasser, supra note 18.
377. The content of these statements epitomizes the type of political dissent that
the First Amendment seeks to protect. See Vitiello, supra note 30, at 1242-43
(describing defendant Bray's publication, A Time to Kill).
378. The ACLA would be able to circumvent this requirement upon a showing that
the physicians' participation in public debate on abortion issues qualified them as
"special purpose" public figures. See supra note 53.
379. See Vitiello, supra note 30, at 1229 (maintaining that while Planned
Parenthood defendants are free to write about killing an abortion provider and
demonstrate near clinics, "[w]hat they cannot do, consistent with the First
Amendment, is to provide potential assassins with useful information about abortion
providers with the intent to increase the risk of violence against their targets");
Saunders, supra note 276 (quoting Lois Backus of Planned Parenthood in Portland:
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This Note argues that the inclusion of personal information
regarding the physicians on the ACLA's posters and website in no
way contributed to its position on abortion issues and amounted to
nothing more than a transparent attempt to attain the highest level of
protection for speech of lesser constitutional value. In finding the
ACLA's defense of political debate a pretext, the materials at issue do
not warrant the highest level of First Amendment protection afforded
to core political speech. The ACLA's effort to target private citizens
under the guise of political debate does not embrace the spirit and
goals underlying the First Amendment.3 8 °
Planned Parenthood requires that the ACLA's First Amendment
rights be balanced against the physicians' fundamental rights to life
and liberty. Upon a determination that the ACLA's claim to political
debate was pretextual, the portions of its materials targeting the
physicians warrant the lower level of constitutional value attributed to
speech at the periphery of the First Amendment's reach.38 1 Supreme
Court precedents strongly suggest that the balance in this case be
weighed in favor of the physicians, as the competing First Amendment
rights do not involve a matter of political or public concern.
CONCLUSION

The controversy stemming from Planned Parenthood has brought
the diluted level of First Amendment protection associated with our
true threats jurisprudence to light. With the Supreme Court closing
its doors to the issue, the Ninth Circuit's final verdict stands. While
the fate of the ACLA's materials may be sealed, the same cannot be
said for true threats jurisprudence.
Rectifying the shortcomings and criticisms of the true threats
doctrine may be achieved by looking to the Supreme Court's
consideration of First Amendment and competing fundamental rights
in several other areas of the law. Precedents from the areas of
defamation, privacy and public employment impart a sense of the
factors and considerations that must be taken into account when
attempting to strike a proper balance between First Amendment and
Importing the public-private
competing fundamental rights.
dichotomy to true threats jurisprudence and allowing for a balance
between First Amendment and competing fundamental rights would
"I think it was glaringly obvious to the jury that these folks were hiding behind a thin
veil of acceptable behavior and they were really frightening extremists.").
380. See supra notes 26-31.
381. Under this framework, the ACLA's practices of endorsing justifiable homicide
through publications such as A Time to Kill and posting pictures of bloody fetuses in
pursuit of rounding up more zealots would still be protected as core political speech
worthy of the highest level of First Amendment protection. These materials would
not trigger the public-private dichotomy, as the advocacy is done in an abstract and
general matter.
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improve the adjudication of true threats. This new standard provides
rigorous First Amendment protection without unnecessarily infringing
upon competing fundamental rights.

